A Comprehensive Analysis of Ratnank Mishra & Ors. v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (2025 INSC 1477) and its Implications for Service Jurisprudence
Introduction: The Eternal Tension Between
Administrative Discretion and Constitutional Equality
The administration of justice is
not confined to the adjudicative chambers of a High Court; it extends
profoundly to its administrative corridors, where the principles it espouses
must be exemplified in its own employment practices. The Supreme Court of
India, in the landmark case of Ratnank Mishra & Ors. v. High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad (2025 INSC 1477), was confronted with a quintessential
constitutional paradox. The case involved the Allahabad High Court, as an
employer, accused of violating Articles 14 and 16 of the very Constitution it
is sworn to uphold, by discriminating between similarly situated employees
appointed under the same discretionary powers of the Chief Justice.
This judgment, delivered by a
Bench comprising Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi, is a masterclass
in applying the doctrine of equality to intricate service law disputes. It
demonstrates the Court's willingness to pierce through procedural
labels—"ad-hoc," "probation," "regular"—to
examine the substantive reality of appointments. Crucially, the Court invoked
the extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do
"complete justice," providing finality to a two-decade-long saga of
uncertainty for a group of employees. This analysis delves into the complex
factual matrix, dissects the legal reasoning, and explores the broader
implications of this significant ruling.
Factual Matrix: A Tale of Two Decades, One
Discretionary Power, and Differential Outcomes
The factual backdrop is lengthy
but essential to appreciate the nuanced discrimination at play.
1. The Governing Framework:
Appointments to the Allahabad High Court staff are governed by the Allahabad
High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976,
framed under Article 229 of the Constitution. The key provisions empowering the
Chief Justice are:
a. Rule 8(a)(i): For Routine Grade
Clerks, recruitment can be "by direct recruitment... or in any manner so
directed by Chief Justice."
b. Rule 41 (Residuary Powers):
Grants the Chief Justice power to make orders on matters not specifically
provided for in the Rules.
c. Rule 45 (Non-Obstante
Power): Notwithstanding anything in the Rules, the Chief Justice has the
power to make orders regarding "recruitment, promotion, confirmation or
any other matter."
2. The Appointments:
Between 2004 and 2005, the appellants (16 individuals) were appointed as
Operator-cum-Data Entry Assistants / Routine Grade Clerks (Class III posts) by
orders of the then Chief Justice, exercising powers under Rules 8(a)(i), 41,
and 45. Their appointment letters variously described their tenure as
"ad-hoc" or contained conditions about future regularisation exams.
3. The Genesis of Litigation
and the 2011 Precedent: Prior disputes over similar appointments culminated
in a pivotal Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated
20.09.2011 in Special Appeal No. 563 of 2008. This judgment held that
appointments made by the Chief Justice under Rules 8(a)(i), 41, and 45 could
not be termed illegal or irregular. The Chief Justice was deemed the "best
person to judge the need of the institution." The Division Bench directed
the Registrar General to take steps for the confirmation/regularisation of the
employees concerned.
4. The Committee and the
Categorisation: Pursuant to the 2011 judgment, the Chief Justice
constituted a two-Judge Committee to examine cases for regularisation. In its
report dated 31.05.2012, the Committee created a tripartite classification,
which became the epicenter of the dispute:
a. Category A (7 persons):
Appointed in 2004 with a stipulation that their ad-hoc appointment would be
regularised upon passing a future exam. The Committee held that since the exam
never materialised and the cadre was declared "dead," the condition
was otiose. They were recommended for regularisation by treating their
appointment as probation under Rules 32 & 33.
b. Category B (6 persons):
Appointed under Rule 45, with no stipulation of "ad-hoc" tenure. The
Committee treated their appointment as de facto probation and recommended
regularisation.
c. Category C (The Appellants,
7 persons): Appointed on an "ad-hoc" basis after 02.09.2004. The
Committee held that since no High Court-specific regularisation rules existed,
the U.P. Regularisation of Ad-hoc Appointments Rules, 1979, applied by default
under Rule 40(2). As these appellants were appointed after the cut-off date
(30.06.1998) under the 1979 State Rules, they were denied regularisation. Their
fate was left contingent on the Chief Justice framing new rules or modifying
the existing ones.
5. The Implementation of
Discrimination: Following the Committee's report, the High Court, vide
order dated 10.07.2012, regularised and promoted the employees in Categories A
and B. The appellants in Category C were rejected. Their services were
ultimately dispensed with in 2015.
6. The Litigative Journey:
The appellants challenged the discrimination before the High Court. A learned
Single Judge, and later a Division Bench (impugned judgments dated 14.10.2015
& 30.10.2015), upheld the denial of regularisation. The Division Bench
offered the appellants only the sop of age relaxation to participate in future
recruitment—a hollow remedy for those who had served for over a decade. It is
against these orders that the appellants approached the Supreme Court.
Legal Arguments: Parity vs. Propriety
Appellants' Contention (Led by Sr. Adv.
P.S. Patwalia):
1. Valid Appointment Channel:
Their appointments were not "backdoor" but traceable to the statutory
authority of Rules 8(a)(i), 41, and 45. They were as valid as those of
Categories A and B.
2. Hostile Discrimination:
Regularising similarly situated colleagues (Categories A & B) while denying
them the same benefit constituted blatant discrimination under Articles 14, 16,
and 21. The distinction based on minor variances in appointment letter
stipulations was arbitrary.
3. Prayer for Finality:
After two decades of service and litigation, remanding the matter would
perpetrate injustice. The Court was urged to exercise its powers under Article
142 to grant final relief.
Respondent High Court's Contention (Led by Ms.
Preetika Dwivedi):
1. Discretionary Nature of
Regularisation: Regularisation is not a right. The High Court, as an
employer, retains discretion in staffing matters.
2. Justification of
Distinction: The Committee's report provided a reasoned basis for
distinguishing Category C due to their "ad-hoc" status and the
absence of applicable regularisation rules.
3. Subsequent Developments:
It was argued that the 2011 Division Bench judgment relied upon by the
appellants stood impliedly overruled by a later Full Bench decision (In Re:
Regularization of Class IV Employees, 2013). Furthermore, the post of Routine
Grade Clerk was a "dead cadre," and regularisation was thus
impractical.
The Supreme Court's Analysis: Dissecting
Arbitrariness in Administrative Action
The Supreme Court allowed the
appeals, finding the High Court's actions constitutionally infirm. Its
reasoning is structured around a relentless application of the equality
principle (Article 14) to the specific facts.
1. The Foundational Finding: Identity of the
Appointment Channel
The Court first established the
critical commonality that rendered subsequent differential treatment suspect.
"the channel of appointment
for the persons who have been regularized and the Respondents herein is through
the exercise of the powers vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court under
Rules 8(a)(i), 41 and 45 of the 1976 Rules." (Para 24)
This was the unifying thread. All
three categories—A, B, and C (the appellants)—were appointed sans the regular
competitive process, purely under the Chief Justice's discretionary powers
under the same Rules. This placed them in a "similarly situated"
position at the point of entry.
2. Demolishing the Artificial Distinctions
The Court then meticulously
dismantled the purported bases for distinguishing Category C from the others.
a. Distinction from Category A
(Stipulated Exam): Category A appointments were also "ad-hoc" and
conditional on an exam. The Court noted the exam was never held. The Committee
itself had found this condition otiose after the cadre was declared "dead."
Therefore, the operational reality for Category A was an ad-hoc appointment
that transitioned to probationary status for regularisation. The absence of a
similar (and defunct) exam condition in the appellants' letters could not
rationally justify denying them the same transition. The distinction was
"arbitrary, unreasonable and superficial." (Para 27)
b. Distinction from Category B
(Non-Ad-hoc Label): Category B appointments were made under Rule 45 without
the "ad-hoc" label. The Court found this to be a distinction without
a substantive difference. The source of power (Chief Justice's discretion) and
the nature of work were identical.
"Merely because the
appointment orders contained different stipulations regarding the nature of
appointment i.e. whether labeled ad-hoc or not, or whether containing a
condition for examination or not, cannot be a rational basis for differential
treatment for purpose of regularization when the channel of such appointments
is identical." (Para 27)
The Court invoked the core of
Article 14: "equals must be treated equally and persons similarly
circumstanced should not be treated differently without a rational and
intelligible differential." (Para 28). The differential treatment based on
the label in the appointment letter, when the substance of the appointment was
the same, failed this test.
3. The High Court as a Model Employer: A
Higher Standard
The judgment makes a powerful
normative statement:
"High Courts, being
Constitutional Courts entrusted to uphold equality and fairness, are expected
to encompass such principles within their own administrative functioning as
well, and must exemplify the standards of a model employer." (Para 29)
This elevates the scrutiny. A
Constitutional Court cannot be perceived as arbitrariness in its own house. Its
administrative actions must withstand the same rigorous constitutional scrutiny
it applies to others. The Court found that the High Court's actions, in this
instance, "pose[d] grave threat to the sacrosanct principles of
non-arbitrariness and reasonableness." (Para 29)
4. Rejecting Post-Hoc Justifications
The Court summarily dismissed
the High Court's ancillary arguments:
a. Dead Cadre/Subsequent Rules:
The argument that the post was a "dead cadre" or that new rules
required computer skills was rejected as "not fair and reasonable."
(Para 31). Since Categories A and B were regularised (and even promoted) after
the cadre was declared dead, denying the same to the appellants on this ground
was inconsistent and discriminatory.
b. Overruling of 2011
Judgment: The Court sidestepped debating whether the 2011 judgment was
overruled, noting that the actionable discrimination arose from the 2012
Committee Report, which created the unsustainable classification.
c. Termination of Services:
The fact that the appellants' services were terminated in 2015 was held to be
irrelevant once the foundational act of discrimination in denying
regularisation (while granting it to peers) was found to be illegal.
5. The Unusual Resort to Article 142: Doing
"Complete Justice"
The Court acknowledged the
general principle of judicial restraint in service matters, leaving
regularisation to employer policy. However, it declared the present case "exceptional."
(Para 33). The exceptional circumstances were:
a. Over a decade of service
rendered by the appellants.
b. Admitted discrimination where
numerous identically situated colleagues were regularised.
c. A litigation span exceeding
two decades.
In such a context, remanding the
matter to the High Court's administration would have been a perpetuation of
injustice. Therefore, the Court held:
"this is a fit case for
exercising our inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India
to issue final operative directions." (Para 33)
The Operative Directions: A Blueprint for
Remedial Justice
Using Article 142, the Supreme
Court issued precise, time-bound directives to remedy the injustice:
1. Reinstatement:
Appellants to be reinstated to their posts.
2. Regularisation: Their
services to be regularised w.e.f. one year from their respective original
appointment dates.
3. Consequential Benefits:
Entitled to all benefits—seniority, promotion, pay fixation, increments,
retiral benefits—for the entire period, except actual salary for the period
they did not work. This balanced the relief for the employer.
4. Timeline: Compliance
directed within 8 weeks.
The Court cautiously added that
these directions were confined to the unique facts of the case and not to be
treated as a precedent.
Critical Analysis and Implications for Legal
Practice
1. Substance Over Form in
Service Law: This judgment reinforces a growing judicial trend to look
beyond the nomenclature used in appointment letters ("ad-hoc,"
"temporary," "contractual") to the substantive nature of
the appointment, the source of power, and the longevity of service when
assessing claims for parity and regularisation.
2. Article 14 as a Robust
Check on Administrative Discretion: The decision is a textbook application
of the "arbitrariness" doctrine under Article 14 from E.P. Royappa
and Maneka Gandhi. It demonstrates that even the wide discretionary powers of a
Constitutional authority like a Chief Justice must be exercised in a
non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner.
3. The "Model
Employer" Doctrine for Constitutional Courts: The judgment imposes a
higher ethical and constitutional standard on courts as employers. Their
internal administrative processes must be paragons of fairness, setting an
example for all other state instrumentalities.
4. Strategic Use of Article
142: The ruling illustrates the Supreme Court's strategic use of Article
142 not to create law, but to remedy protracted injustice in unique factual
scenarios where the ordinary legal process has failed to deliver a just
outcome. It provides a template for arguing for Article 142 relief in service
matters involving long delays and manifest injustice.
5. Cautionary Tale for
Employers: For all public employers, especially those with discretionary
appointment powers, the case serves as a stark warning. Creating sub-classes
among similarly appointed employees based on minor textual differences in
appointment letters is legally perilous and likely to be struck down as
arbitrary.
6. Limits of the Precedent:
The Court's explicit caveat that this is not a precedent is significant. It
prevents a wholesale challenge to regularisation policies. The relief was
rooted in the specific evidence of others being regularised through the identical
discretionary channel. Future litigants must establish a similarly clear-cut
case of "hostile discrimination" among identically situated groups.
Conclusion: A Triumph of Constitutional
Morality Over Administrative Convenience
Ratnank Mishra & Ors. v. High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad stands as a powerful testament to the Supreme
Court's role as the ultimate guarantor of constitutional justice, even against
another pillar of the State. The judgment is a meticulous exercise in
comparative legal analysis, demonstrating that the sophisticated tools of
constitutional law—the arbitrariness doctrine, the model employer principle,
and the power to do complete justice—can be effectively deployed to cure
deep-seated institutional inequities.
For the legal practitioner, it is
a rich resource on arguing discrimination in service jurisprudence, emphasizing
the need to establish a clear "comparator" group and demonstrating
the irrationality of the distinction. It reaffirms that in the court of law,
and indeed in the corridors of justice itself, substantive equality must always
prevail over formalistic distinctions.
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