An Exhaustive Analysis of Syed Shahnawaz Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2025 INSC 1484) and its Impact on Revisional Jurisprudence
Introduction: The Procedural Conundrum of a
Deceased Revisionist
The criminal justice system often
presents scenarios where procedural technicalities threaten to eclipse
substantive justice. One such complex intersection arises upon the death of a
litigant during the pendency of criminal proceedings. While the abatement of
appeals is governed by the explicit mandate of Section 394 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the fate of a criminal revision petition upon the
demise of the revisionist has long been a grey area, fraught with conflicting
judicial interpretations. Does the revision abate ipso facto? Can a legal heir
be substituted? What is the nature of the court's power in such a circumstance?
The Supreme Court of India, in a
lucid and precedentially rich judgment in Syed Shahnawaz Ali v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors. (2025 INSC 1484), has provided authoritative clarity. A
Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Manoj Misra (author) set aside the
Madhya Pradesh High Court's orders that had dismissed a revision as abated
following the revisionist's death and subsequently rejected his son's
application to continue the proceedings. In doing so, the Court has performed a
masterful synthesis of constitutional principles, statutory interpretation, and
the evolving jurisprudence on victims' rights, delivering a landmark ruling
that redefines the procedural landscape of criminal revisions.
Factual Matrix: Forgery,
Discharge, and a Father's Unfinished Legal Battle
The factual backdrop is critical
to appreciating the legal principles at stake.
A. Genesis of the Prosecution:
The appellant's father, Shamshad Ali, initiated criminal action by filing an
application under Section 156(3) CrPC against Respondents 2 to 5 (the accused).
The allegation pertained to the fabrication of a sale deed to stake a false
claim to his property. Pursuant to the court's direction, an FIR was registered
for offences under Sections 419 (cheating by personation), 420 (cheating), 467
(forgery of valuable security), 468 (forgery for purpose of cheating), 471
(using as genuine a forged document), 120-B (criminal conspiracy), and 34
(common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
B. The Discharge Order:
After investigation, a chargesheet was filed. However, the trial court (XVIIIth
Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal), vide order dated 07.03.2020, discharged the
accused for all offences except Section 420 IPC. The charges for serious
forgery and conspiracy were dropped.
C. The Revision and the
Demise: Aggrieved by this discharge order, Shamshad Ali (the informant)
filed Criminal Revision No. 1986 of 2020 before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh. Tragically, during the pendency of this revision, Shamshad Ali died on
05.05.2021.
D. The Procedural Impasse:
The appellant, Syed Shahnawaz Ali (the son), who was also a witness in the
case, filed an application (IA No. 19769 of 2021) seeking to continue the
revision proceedings. The High Court, by order dated 21.02.2024, rejected this
application. It held that there was no provision for substitution in a criminal
revision and, consequently, the revision would abate. The appellant's
subsequent application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) / Section 482 CrPC for recall of this order was also
dismissed on 31.08.2024.
E. The Core Legal Dispute:
The appellant, before the Supreme Court, contended that he was a
"victim" under Section 2(wa) CrPC and thus entitled to continue the
revision. In the alternative, he argued that a revision does not abate, and the
High Court was obligated to decide it on merits, potentially with the
assistance of an amicus curiae. The accused-respondents countered that Section
394 CrPC, governing abatement, applies only to appeals; the absence of a
corresponding provision for revision implies no right of substitution exists
for a legal heir.
Deconstructing 'Abatement': A Foundational
Analysis
Before adjudicating the specific
issue, Justice Misra's judgment provides an invaluable primer on the concept of
'abatement' itself. Drawing from Black's Law Dictionary and P. Ramanatha
Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, the Court outlines its multifaceted meanings, but
crucially highlights its core characteristic in legal proceedings: the
termination of an action without a decision on the merits and without the
prosecutor's assent.
The Court then distinguishes the
civil and criminal contexts:
1. Civil Proceeding: Abates if
the right to sue or be sued does not survive the deceased party.
2. Criminal Proceeding: The trial is in
personam—against the accused. Therefore, if the accused dies, the trial and any
appeal against his acquittal abate, as the subject of prosecution ceases to
exist. However, if a convicted accused dies during his appeal, the proviso to
Section 394(2) CrPC allows a near relative to seek leave to continue the
appeal, primarily to clear the family's honour.
This sets the stage for the
central question: Does this logic of abatement apply to a revision filed by an informant/complainant,
when the main trial against the accused remains very much alive?
The Nature of Revisional Jurisdiction: A
Power, Not a Right
The judgment's pivotal
contribution lies in its meticulous analysis of the inherent character of
revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC. The Court anchors its
reasoning in the seminal Constitution Bench decision in Prabhu Kumar Mitra v.
State of West Bengal & Anr. (AIR 1959 SC 144), which remains the lodestar
on this issue.
The Court extracts and
reaffirms the following cardinal principles from Prabhu Kumar Mitra:
1. Discretionary Supervisory
Power: Revisional power is a discretionary power vested in the High Court
(and Sessions Court) to supervise the administration of criminal justice. It is
not a right vested in the litigant, unlike an appeal.
2. Suo Motu Character: The
power can be exercised suo motu by the court upon examining the record. This is
a defining feature that distinguishes it from an appeal.
3. The "Rule" and its
Survival: Once the court entertains a revision and issues a Rule (i.e.,
admits the revision for hearing), "that Rule has to be heard and
determined in accordance with law, whether or not the petitioner is alive or
dead, or whether he is represented in court by a legal practitioner."
4. Legislative Silence as
Intent: The Legislature, while enacting specific abatement rules for
appeals (Section 431 of the 1898 Code, now Section 394), consciously omitted
such provisions for revisions. This indicates an intent to leave the High
Court's revisional power "untouched—to be exercised according to the
exigencies of each case."
The Court further fortifies this
position by citing Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2022), which
held that since revision can be exercised suo motu, "there can be no bar
on a third party invoking the revisional jurisdiction and inviting the
attention of the High Court that an occasion to exercise the power has
arisen."
From this jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court deduces a coherent framework:
(a) Revisional power is discretionary, not
claimable as of right.
(b) Its exercise is not dependent on the
petitioner; it can be suo motu.
(c) The revisionist's role is merely to
"invite attention" of the court to a potential illegality.
(d) Once a Rule is issued, it must ordinarily
be heard on merits, irrespective of the petitioner's death.
(e) The court discharges a statutory
supervisory function to examine the "correctness, legality or
propriety" of a subordinate court's order.
The Synthesized Doctrine: Abatement,
Discretion, and the Victim's Portal
Building on this foundation, the
Supreme Court articulates a nuanced, principle-based doctrine to govern the
death of a revisionist.
1. The General Rule: No Automatic Abatement
The Court holds unequivocally:
"the law of abatement that applies to an appeal does not apply to a
revision proceeding." The absence of a provision like Section 394 for
revisions is not a void but a deliberate design, leaving discretion with the
revisional court.
2. Discretion Must Be Guided: The
"Victim" as a Compass
While discretion is wide, it must
be exercised judiciously to prevent abuse by "those who have an axe to
grind." To guide this discretion, the Court innovatively harnesses the
definition of a "victim" under Section 2(wa) CrPC. A
"victim" includes not only the person who suffered loss or injury but
also "his or her guardian or legal heir." This definition, the Court
reasons, provides a sound principle for deciding whether to allow a person to
assist or continue a revision.
3. Differential Treatment Based on Identity of
the Deceased Revisionist
The Court creates a logical
bifurcation:
a. A. Revision by an
Accused/Convict: If the revisionist is an accused challenging an
interlocutory order or a conviction, the court may refuse to continue the
proceedings upon his death. Reasons:
1. If the revision emanates from a trial
proceeding, the trial itself abates on the accused's death.
2. If challenging a conviction,
the sentence cannot be executed against a deceased person. In the absence of a
leave application (akin to Section 394(2) proviso), the court may terminate the
proceedings.
b. B. Revision by an
Informant/Complainant/Victim: This is the scenario in the instant case.
Here, the proceedings will not abate. The revisional court retains the
discretion to proceed and test the impugned order's legality. The death of the
informant does not extinguish the alleged crime or the pending trial against
the living accused.
4. Substitution vs. Assistance: A Semantic
Distinction with Legal Substance
The Court makes a critical
distinction that resolves much of the confusion:
a. No Right to Substitution:
There is no specific provision for "substitution" in a revision.
Therefore, a legal heir cannot claim it as a right.
b. Discretion to Allow
Assistance: However, the revisional court has the inherent discretion to allow
a person to assist it in discharging its statutory supervisory function. A
"victim" (including a legal heir under Section 2(wa)) is
"ordinarily the most suitable person" for this role, as they have a
direct interest in the outcome.
This elegant formulation respects
the statutory scheme (no substitution) while fulfilling the ends of justice
(allowing interested party assistance). The Court holds: "though a person
may not have a legal right to claim substitution as a revisionist, there is no
legal restriction on revisional court’s power in allowing a person to assist
the Court in furthering the cause of justice."
Application to the Instant Case: Restoring the
Revision
Applying this synthesized
doctrine, the Supreme Court found the High Court's orders "unsustainable
in law."
1.Error in Law: The High
Court erred in holding the revision abated. The revision was at the instance of
the informant/victim (Shamshad Ali), and the trial against the accused was
still pending. The revision did not abate automatically.
2.The Appellant's Locus:
The appellant, being the son and legal heir of the deceased, stood to inherit
the property which was the subject matter of the alleged forgery. Thus, he
squarely fell within the definition of a "victim" under Section 2(wa)
CrPC. He had a "vital interest in the outcome of the proceeding." The
High Court should have, in its discretion, allowed him to assist the court in
the capacity of a victim.
Conclusion and Implications: A Victim-Centric
Procedural Renaissance
The Supreme Court allowed the
appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and restored Criminal Revision No.
1986 of 2020. It granted liberty to the appellant to assist the revisional
court "in the capacity of a victim of the crime" and directed
expeditious disposal.
The implications of Syed
Shahnawaz Ali are profound for criminal practice:
1. Clarity on a Long-Standing
Ambiguity: The judgment settles the debate on abatement in revisions,
providing a clear, principle-driven framework that lower courts must follow.
2. Empowerment of Victims and
Legal Heirs: It significantly amplifies the role of the "victim"
in the post-conviction/pre-conviction appellate process. Legal heirs are no
longer mere spectators but potential participants in ensuring justice for the
deceased victim.
3. Reinforcement of Court's
Supervisory Role: The judgment powerfully reaffirms that revisional jurisdiction
is a public function for correcting judicial errors. The death of a private
party who triggered the process does not terminate this public duty if the
underlying judicial order requires scrutiny.
4. Practical Litigation
Guidance: For practitioners, the judgment provides a clear roadmap. In
cases involving the death of a revisionist-complainant, the application should:
a. Frame the legal heir as a
"victim" under Section 2(wa) CrPC.
b. Seek "leave to
assist" the court in its revisional jurisdiction, not
"substitution."
c. Emphasize the continuing
pendency of the main trial and the need for the supervisory court to examine
the legality of the impugned order.
In essence, the Supreme Court has
performed a delicate balancing act. It has refused to import the rigid
appeal-centric doctrine of abatement into the fluid realm of revision, while
simultaneously erecting prudent safeguards against frivolous litigation by
employing the "victim" filter. The judgment marks a sophisticated
evolution in criminal procedure, one that prioritizes substantive justice over
procedural technicality, and in doing so, strengthens the foundational promise
of a fair and robust criminal justice system.
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