A recent Supreme Court judgment has delivered a significant verdict on a critical issue in higher education governance: the primacy of University Grants Commission (UGC) regulations over state legislation in matters of academic appointments. The case of Dr. S. Mohan, the appointed Vice-Chancellor of Puducherry Technological University, brings into sharp focus the complex constitutional division of powers between the Centre and States, the binding nature of UGC norms, and the extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court to ensure justice. This ruling has far-reaching implications for university administrations across India.
I. The Case at a Glance: Appointment,
Challenge, and Nullification
The Puducherry Legislative
Assembly enacted the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act).
Under this Act, a Search-cum-Selection Committee was constituted to recommend
names for the post of the university's first Vice-Chancellor. This committee,
as per Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, comprised:
1.A nominee of the Chancellor (an
eminent person in Engineering/Technology).
2.A nominee of the Government.
3.The Secretary to the Government
(Higher & Technical Education) – for the first VC appointment.
Following the committee's
recommendations, Dr. S. Mohan was appointed as Vice-Chancellor in December 2021
for a five-year term.
This appointment was challenged
before the Madras High Court by two petitioners. Their core argument was that
the constitution of the Search Committee violated the UGC Regulations on
Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in
Universities and Colleges, 2018. Specifically, they pointed to Regulation 7.3,
which mandates that the Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must
include:
a. Persons of eminence in higher
education.
b. One member nominated by the
Chairman of the UGC.
c. Members who are not connected
in any manner with the concerned university.
The High Court, in December 2023,
agreed with the petitioners. It held that Section 14(5) of the PTU Act was ultra
vires (beyond legal authority) as it was inconsistent with the mandatory UGC
Regulation 7.3. Consequently, it quashed Dr. Mohan's appointment. However, to
avoid an administrative vacuum, it allowed him to continue until June 2024 or
until a new VC was appointed.
Dr. Mohan appealed to the Supreme
Court, leading to this landmark judgment.
II. The Core Legal Battle: Legislative
Competence and Repugnancy
The appeal revolved around
intricate questions of constitutional law:
1.Legislative Field: Does
the power to prescribe the composition of a Vice-Chancellor's Search Committee
fall under Entry 66 of List I (Union List: "Coordination and determination
of standards in institutions for higher education") or Entry 25 of List
III (Concurrent List: "Education")?
2.Primacy of UGC Regulations:
Are the UGC Regulations, framed under the UGC Act (a Central law under Entry
66), binding on State universities, even those established by State
legislation?
3.Doctrine of Repugnancy:
Was there a repugnancy between the PTU Act (State law) and the UGC Regulations
(Central law) under Article 254 of the Constitution, requiring Presidential
assent for the State law to prevail?
III. The Supreme Court's Analysis: A
Step-by-Step Reasoning
The Supreme Court, in a judgment
authored by Justice Sandeep Mehta, upheld the High Court's conclusion on the
illegality of the appointment but modified the relief using its extraordinary
powers.
I. Determining the Legislative Field: Entry 66
vs. Entry 25
The appellant (Dr. Mohan) argued
that the composition of a Search Committee was an "administrative or
governance matter" falling under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List
(Education), where both Centre and States can legislate. He contended that UGC's
power under Entry 66 of the Union List was limited to prescribing academic standards
(like curriculum, degrees) and did not extend to appointment procedures.
The Supreme Court firmly rejected
this narrow interpretation. It relied on a consistent line of precedents,
including the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. Preeti Srivastava vs. State of
M.P., which held:
a. While States can legislate on
education, their power is "subject to" Entry 66 of List I.
b. Entry 66 gives the Union exclusive
power to coordinate and determine standards in higher education.
c. A State cannot, while
regulating education, impinge upon or dilute the standards prescribed by the
Union.
The Court reasoned that the "determination
of standards" under Entry 66 is not confined to syllabi or examinations.
It encompasses all elements that ensure the quality and integrity of higher
education institutions. The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor—the academic and
administrative head of a university—is fundamental to maintaining those
standards. Therefore, norms for such an appointment, including the impartial
and expert constitution of the selecting body, squarely fall within the Union's
domain under Entry 66.
Conclusion: The UGC
Regulations on appointing a VC trace their source to Entry 66, List I (Union
Power). The PTU Act, to the extent it deals with this subject, operates in a
field where the Union has already legislated.
II. The Binding Nature and Primacy of UGC
Regulations
Having established that the UGC
Regulations are framed under the Union's exclusive power, the Court affirmed
their mandatory and overriding character. It cited its earlier judgment in Gambhirdhan
K. Gadhvi vs. State of Gujarat, which held that UGC Regulations, being
subordinate legislation laid before Parliament, become part of the parent UGC
Act. Any appointment made in violation of these Regulations is a violation of
statutory provisions.
The Court found two clear
violations of Regulation 7.3:
1.Absence of UGC Nominee:
The PTU Act's Search Committee had no member nominated by the UGC Chairman, a
mandatory requirement.
2.Member with Conflict of
Interest: The Committee included the Secretary (Higher Education), who, as
Pro-Chancellor and former member of the university's predecessor college, was
"connected" to the university, violating the regulation's stipulation
against members with university links.
Thus, the very foundation of the
selection process—the constitution of the Committee—was vitiated (flawed). An
appointment arising from an illegal process cannot be legally sustained.
III. Repugnancy Under Article 254: A Moot
Point
The High Court had extensively
discussed Article 254, which deals with repugnancy between Central and State
laws on subjects in the Concurrent List (List III). It suggested that for the
State law (PTU Act) to prevail over the Central law (UGC Act/Regulations)
despite inconsistency, it needed specific Presidential assent, which was not
demonstrated.
The Supreme Court clarified and
simplified this. It invoked the classic precedent of Hoechst Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, which holds that the doctrine of repugnancy under
Article 254 is triggered only when both laws occupy the same field in the
Concurrent List.
In this case, the Court had
already concluded that the UGC Regulations operated under Entry 66 of the Union
List (Exclusive Central power), while the PTU Act was traceable to Entry 25 of
the Concurrent List. Since they were not operating in the same legislative
field (List III), the question of repugnancy under Article 254 did not arise at
all.
The conflict was resolved at the
more fundamental level of legislative competence. The State law, insofar as it
contravened the Central law framed under an exclusive Union power, was simply ultra
vires (beyond the State's legislative competence). It failed not because of
repugnancy, but due to a "want of legislative competence."
IV. The Supreme Court's Unique Relief Under
Article 142
Having upheld the legal finding
that the appointment was invalid, the Court faced a consequential question:
What should be the fate of Dr. Mohan?
The Court noted several
compelling factors:
a. No Malice or
Disqualification: There was no allegation against Dr. Mohan's
qualifications, integrity, or performance. He was found meritorious by the
original committee.
b. Substantial Tenure Served:
He had already served for over four years without complaint.
c. Disruption to University:
His sudden removal would cause avoidable administrative and academic disruption.
d. Time for Fresh Process:
Conducting a fresh selection adhering to UGC norms would take time.
Balancing the rigor of the law
with the demands of justice and institutional stability, the Supreme Court
invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution to
"do complete justice."
It directed:
1.Dr. S. Mohan shall continue as
Vice-Chancellor until the end of his original five-year term (December 2026) or
until a new VC is duly selected as per UGC Regulations, whichever is earlier.
2.He shall be eligible to apply
for the post in the fresh selection process without any prejudice from this
judgment.
3.The Puducherry Legislature
remains free to amend the PTU Act to align it with UGC Regulations for future
appointments.
V. Key Takeaways and Implications of the
Judgment
1.UGC Regulations are Supreme
in Academic Standards: The judgment unequivocally establishes that UGC
Regulations framed under Entry 66, List I are binding on all universities,
including those established by State Acts. States cannot circumvent these
standards through their own legislation.
2.Broad Interpretation of
"Standards": The "determination of standards" in higher
education includes governance and appointment norms for key positions like the
Vice-Chancellor, not just curricular or academic benchmarks.
3.Procedure is Substance:
The integrity of the process of appointment (a properly constituted Search
Committee) is as crucial as the qualifications of the candidate. A flaw in the
process invalidates the outcome.
4.Clarification on Repugnancy:
The ruling provides clarity that a conflict between a State law (under
Concurrent List) and a Central law (under Union List) is decided on the ground
of legislative competence, not repugnancy under Article 254.
5.Article 142 as a Tool for
Equitable Justice: The judgment showcases the Supreme Court's use of
Article 142 not to override the law, but to mitigate its potentially harsh
consequences in unique circumstances, ensuring stability and fairness.
6.Wake-up Call for State
Legislatures: State governments must ensure their university laws and
practices are in strict conformity with UGC Regulations. Non-compliance risks
legal challenges and invalidates appointments.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in
Dr. S. Mohan's case is a robust reaffirmation of the Union's overarching role
in preserving national standards in higher education. It draws a clear
constitutional boundary, preventing a fragmented approach to university
governance that could compromise educational quality.
While the law was firmly upheld,
the Court's nuanced relief under Article 142 recognized the human and
institutional dimensions of the case, preventing undue hardship and disruption.
This balance between legal principle and practical wisdom makes the judgment a
landmark in Indian educational jurisprudence, guiding future appointments and
legislative actions in the sector.
Judgment Name: Dr. S.
Mohan vs. The Secretary to the Chancellor, Puducherry Technological University
& Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 54-55 of 2025), Supreme Court of India, decided
on January 30, 2026.
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