A Tale of Two Decades: When Separation Becomes Cruelty and Courts Dissolve Dead Marriages

Supreme Court

Introduction: The Supreme Court's Power to Grant Justice Beyond Fault

In a landmark judgment delivered on December 15, 2025, the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, wielded its extraordinary constitutional power to dissolve a marriage that had effectively ceased to exist for over two decades. This decision is a profound exposition of modern matrimonial jurisprudence, balancing the sanctity of marriage with the stark reality of its irretrievable breakdown. It underscores a significant shift from a rigid "fault-based" divorce system to one that acknowledges human suffering and the futility of preserving a legal tie that has lost all meaning.

For lawyers, this judgment is a critical precedent on the application of Article 142(1) of the Constitution to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, even when traditional grounds like desertion or cruelty are not conclusively proven. For laypersons, it is a poignant reminder that the law is not blind to prolonged human misery and that a marriage, at its core, is a union of hearts and minds, not just a legal contract.

Parawise Analysis of the Supreme Court's Judgment

Paragraph 1-2: The Legal Battle Commences

The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged a 2011 judgment of the Gauhati High Court. The High Court had overturned a divorce decree granted by the Family Court in Shillong. The core dispute was simple yet agonizing: the husband (Appellant) sought divorce on grounds of desertion, while the wife (Respondent) contended she was driven out due to mistreatment. Their marriage, solemnized in August 2000, began to unravel barely a year later.

Paragraph 3-4: The Wife's Narrative of Compulsion

The wife’s case painted a picture of pressure and conflict. She alleged that despite the husband being aware of her financial responsibilities towards her ailing mother and family, he and his family demanded she quit her job as a Development Officer with LIC. Unable to bear this ill-treatment, which threatened her family's survival, she left the matrimonial home in 2001. The husband filed for divorce in 2003 under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (desertion), but the suit was dismissed as premature since the mandatory two-year separation period had not elapsed.

Paragraph 5-8: The Litigation Odyssey

After withdrawing his first appeal, the husband filed a fresh suit in 2007. The Trial Court, in 2010, granted the divorce, accepting his plea of desertion. The wife appealed. The High Court, in a detailed analysis, reversed this decree. It held that the husband failed to prove the wife had the "animus deserendi"—the permanent intention to forsake the marriage. The Court scrutinized the husband’s alleged reconciliation attempts, particularly a letter dated November 12, 2002. It found the letter to be more of an ultimatum than a sincere olive branch, noting it admitted to family issues that forced her to leave. The High Court concluded there was no desertion by the wife; instead, she had reasonable cause to leave and remained willing to resume cohabitation.

Paragraph 9-12: The Husband's Plea to the Apex Court

Before the Supreme Court, the husband’s counsel argued that the parties had lived apart since 2001—a separation spanning 24 years. He emphasized the complete absence of reconciliation, noting they worked in the same LIC branch yet did not interact. He contended the marriage had irretrievably broken down, a fact more significant than the disputed allegations of desertion. He maintained the Trial Court correctly appreciated the ingredients of desertion: factum of separation and intention to end cohabitation.

Paragraph 13-19: The Wife's Stand: No Desertion, Only Compulsion

The wife’s counsel vehemently denied any desertion. He argued she was a victim of cruelty, forced to choose between her matrimonial home and her destitute parental family. The letters from the husband in 2002 were dismissed as an "eye-wash," not genuine attempts at reconciliation. He pointed to the husband’s haste in filing for divorce in 2003 as evidence of his intent to end the marriage. Relying on precedents like Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, he argued that a marriage cannot be dissolved merely because one party declares it broken down. He asserted the wife continued to affirm the marriage and was ready to cohabit.

Paragraph 20-23: The Court's Focus: The Unassailable Reality of 24-Year Separation

The Supreme Court shifted the lens from the "whodunit" of fault to the undeniable factual matrix. The parties had been litigating for 22 years and living separately for 24. There was no child from the marriage. A court-ordered mediation in 2012 had failed. The Court invoked the principle that such a long period of separation, with no hope of reconciliation, is itself a source of immense mental cruelty to both parties. It referenced Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, where a 25-year separation was held to signify an irretrievably broken marriage, constituting cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act.

Paragraph 24-27: Clashing Ideologies as Cruelty

The Court made a profound observation relevant to modern marriages. It noted that the spouses held "strongly held views" on matrimonial life—he insisting on a traditional role, she on her career and family duties. Their prolonged refusal to accommodate each other's perspectives had created an unworkable relationship. This stubborn incompatibility, sustained over decades, itself amounted to mental cruelty. The Court clarified that it was not its role to judge which spouse's view was "correct," but to recognize that their mutual inflexibility had destroyed the marital bond. It distinguished the wife’s cited precedent (Prabhamani) as inapplicable, stating this was not a case of a party misusing the "irretrievable breakdown" bogey.

Paragraph 28-32: The Constitutional Power to Do "Complete Justice" Under Article 142

This is the jurisprudential heart of the judgment. The Court held that its power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution to do "complete justice" is not constrained by the fault-based doctrine governing ordinary divorce petitions. It extensively quoted the Constitution Bench in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, which criticized the fault theory for forcing courts to dwell on "concrete instances of adverse human behaviour, thereby maligning the institution of marriage."

a. The Court emphasized that apportioning blame is not necessary in rare and exceptional cases where the marriage is visibly dead.

b. It cited Shilpa Sailesh: "No spouse can be compelled to resume life with a consort, and as such, nothing is gained by keeping the parties tied forever to a marriage which has, in fact, ceased to exist."

c. It referenced recent cases like Pradeep Bhardwaj v. Priya and Kumari Rekha v. Shambhu Saran Paswan, where it exercised Article 142 powers to dissolve marriages upon finding an irretrievable breakdown, even absent specific grounds under the Hindu Marriage Act.

Paragraph 33-34: The End of Sanctity and the Need for Closure

The Court acknowledged the principle of preserving marital sanctity. However, it ruled that in this case, no sanctity remained after 24 years of estrangement. Rapprochement was impossible. With no children affected, divorce would not devastate any third party. The Court warned that allowing such litigation to perpetuate only sustains a "marriage on paper," harming the parties and wasting judicial resources. It served no "useful purpose" to deny relief.

Paragraph 35: The Final Decree

Exercising its plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court dissolved the marriage between Nayan Bhowmick and Aparna Chakraborty on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. It upheld the original divorce decree of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong (from 2010), and set aside the High Court's order that had reversed it. The 25-year legal saga was brought to an end.

 Conclusion: A Judgment for Humanity and Pragmatism

Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty is more than a divorce decree. It is a statement that the law must serve justice, not just procedure. For the legal community, it solidifies Article 142 as a vital tool to address the gaps in statutory divorce law, providing an escape hatch from marriages that are legal prisons. It reaffirms that prolonged separation can metamorphose into legal cruelty.

For society, it sends a compassionate message: a marriage requires more than a certificate to survive; it needs cohabitation, companionship, and mutual respect. When these vanish for a period as long as a generation, the law must have the courage to acknowledge the death of the relationship and grant closure. This judgment moves Indian family law closer to a balance between preserving the institution of marriage and alleviating the suffering trapped within its broken frames.

Case Cited: Nayan Bhowmick vs. Aparna Chakraborty, Civil Appeal No. 5167 of 2012, Supreme Court of India, Judgement delivered on December 15, 2025.

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