A High Court Analysis of Political Protest, Unlawful Assembly, and the Critical Role of Section 195 Cr.P.C.
In a judgment that reinforces the constitutional safeguards for democratic dissent while clarifying procedural boundaries for law enforcement, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, on November 29, 2025, quashed a First Information Report (FIR) and subsequent chargesheet against prominent political leaders, including Bhagwant Mann. The case, Bhagwant Mann & Ors. v. U.T. Chandigarh, provides a comprehensive legal roadmap on when protests cross the line into criminality and when police action against them may not withstand judicial scrutiny.
This ruling is essential reading for police officers, magistrates, public prosecutors, political activists, and legal professionals, as it dissects the interplay between the right to peaceful assembly, the definition of "unlawful assembly," and the mandatory legal procedures that govern prosecutions for offences against public servants.
The Protest and the Police Case: A Chronology
The case stemmed from a political protest in Chandigarh on January 10, 2020.
The Allegations (Per the FIR):
Workers and leaders of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), Punjab unit, gathered for a rally against a hike in electricity tariffs. The gathering, comprising 750-800 people, was addressed by leaders including the petitioners. Subsequently, they began a protest march towards the official residence of the Chief Minister of Punjab.
At the exit gate of the MLA Hostel, a police barricade was erected. Police officials, including a Duty Magistrate, informed the crowd that their gathering was "against the law" and "unconstitutional" as it violated prohibitory orders (implying Section 144 Cr.P.C.), and that an assembly of more than five persons outside the designated rally ground was not permitted. The police offered that 2-3 representatives could submit a memorandum.
The FIR alleges that, instigated by the leaders, the crowd began pushing and shoving the police force, attempting to break the barricade. Following orders from the Duty Magistrate, water was "lightly showered" on the crowd. At this point, the "furious mob suddenly started pelting stones," causing injuries to four police officials. The FIR was registered under Sections 147 (rioting), 148 (rioting armed with deadly weapon), 149 (unlawful assembly), 332 (voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant), 353 (assault/criminal force to deter public servant), and 188 (disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Investigation and Chargesheet:
* The offence under Section 188 IPC was later deleted on the advice of the District Attorney.
* The Medico-Legal Reports (MLRs) declared all injuries to police officials as "simple" – comprising abrasions, swellings, and pain (e.g., "red abrasion over right cheek," "pain in left shoulder").
* The final chargesheet, filed on July 15, 2021, was presented against the petitioners (the named leaders) under Sections 147, 149, 332, and 353 IPC. Notably, it recorded that no order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. had been issued by the Deputy Commissioner on that date. It also stated that after identification of the accused and 750-800 workers, a supplementary chargesheet would follow.
The petitioners approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking to quash the FIR and all consequential proceedings.
The Legal Battle: Key Arguments
Petitioners' Contention:
1. No Specific Overt Acts: No specific act of violence, instigation, or stone-throwing was attributed to the petitioner-leaders individually.
2. Nature of Injuries: Injuries were minor and simple, consistent with a scuffle or pushing, not a premeditated violent assault.
3. Absence of Section 144 Order: Crucially, since no valid order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. existed, the police had no legal basis to prevent a peaceful protest or declare the assembly "unlawful." The right to protest under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution was being exercised.
4. Evasion of Section 195 Cr.P.C.: The genesis of the case was the alleged violation of a public order (Section 188 IPC). Deleting this offence was a deliberate ploy to evade Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C., which mandates that a court can only take cognizance of offences under Sections 172 to 188 IPC upon a written complaint by the concerned public servant. Without such a complaint, the entire prosecution was void.
5. Ingredients of Offences Not Met: The essential elements of causing hurt (Sec 332) or assault to deter a public servant (Sec 353) were not made out against the petitioners.
State's Contention:
1. Unruly Protest: The petitioners led an unlawful protest that turned violent, obstructing police duty and causing injuries.
2. Common Intention: By instigating the crowd, the petitioners shared a common intention, making them liable under Sections 149, 332, and 353 IPC.
3. Section 195 Cr.P.C. Not a Bar to FIR: The provision bars cognizance by the court, not the registration of an FIR or investigation. This has been settled by the Supreme Court. Deletion of Section 188 IPC was legally permissible.
The High Court's Reasoning: A Two-Pronged Analysis
Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya structured the judgment around two core issues, delivering clarity on each.
Issue 1: The Spectre of Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Can Offences Be "Split"?
This was the more complex procedural question. The petitioners argued that by deleting Section 188 IPC (which falls under Section 195's purview), the police illegally "split" the transaction to prosecute them for other offences.
The High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's authoritative ruling in Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2025), laid down the law clearly:
i. The Bar is on Cognizance, Not Investigation: Section 195 Cr.P.C. creates a bar on the court's power to take cognizance of specified offences (like Sec 188 IPC) without a written complaint from the public servant concerned. It does not bar the police from registering an FIR or investigating. Therefore, the perceived non-compliance at the investigation stage was not a ground to quash the FIR itself.
ii. The "Composite Transaction" Test: The critical test arises when allegations involve a single transaction comprising:
a) Offences requiring a Section 195 complaint (e.g., Sec 188 IPC), and
b) Other cognizable offences not requiring such a complaint (e.g., Sec 332, 353 IPC).
The Rule: If the offences are part of the same, indivisible transaction, the state cannot simply drop the Section 195 offence and proceed only on the others to avoid the mandatory procedure. This would be a fraud on the law.
However, if the facts give rise to distinct and separable offences, prosecution can proceed for the latter category without a Section 195 complaint.
Application to the Case: The Court noted that the stage of cognizance had not yet been reached. Therefore, the challenge based on Section 195 Cr.P.C. was premature. However, this analysis set the stage for the more substantive second issue.
Issue 2: Does the FIR Disclose a Prima Facie Case Against the Petitioners?
This is where the prosecution's case crumbled. The High Court applied the well-settled principle that an FIR can be quashed if, even assuming the allegations to be true, it does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence by the accused.
The Court conducted a meticulous, ingredient-by-ingredient analysis:
A. The Foundation: Was it an "Unlawful Assembly"? (Sections 147 & 149 IPC)
i. Sections 146 & 149 IPC predicate liability on the existence of an "unlawful assembly" (defined under Section 141 IPC as an assembly of five or more persons with a common object to use criminal force, etc.).
ii. A key circumstance making an assembly "unlawful" is its defiance of a legal order promulgated by a public servant.
iii. The Fatal Flaw: The chargesheet itself admitted that no order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. had been issued by the Deputy Commissioner on that day. The police's oral assertion of a violation was legally baseless.
Conclusion: In the absence of a prohibitory order, the assembly could not be termed "unlawful." If there is no unlawful assembly, there can be no rioting (Sec 147) and no vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC. This knocked out the foundational charges.
B. Specific Offences: Sections 332 & 353 IPC
i. Section 332 IPC requires voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant.
ii. Section 353 IPC requires assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant.
iii. The Gap in Allegations: The FIR and chargesheet were utterly silent on any specific, voluntary act by any of the petitioner-leaders that caused hurt or used criminal force. They were not accused of throwing stones, pushing, or hitting anyone.
iv. Attribution of Mob Action: The allegation was that after water was showered, the "mob suddenly started pelting stones." No words, gestures, or specific instigation by the petitioners leading to this sudden act were mentioned. The "instigation" alleged was generic – addressing the crowd about the protest's purpose.
v. Nature of Injuries: The injuries (abrasions, pain, swelling) were consistent with the "shoving and jostling" of a crowd trying to move forward, not a targeted assault. The Court observed the trigger for the mob's fury appeared to be the police action of shooting water.
Conclusion: No specific material linked the petitioners to acts constituting hurt or criminal force. Mere presence as leaders, without specific allegations of incitement to violence, was insufficient to frame charges under these sections.
C. The Evidentiary Void: Identification and Specifics
The Court highlighted the chargesheet's admission that the petitioners "could not be identified" among the crowd for specific violent acts and that a supplementary chargesheet was needed. This underscored the lack of concrete evidence against them at the investigation's conclusion.
The Final Ruling and Its Implications
The High Court allowed the petitions and quashed the FIR and all proceedings against the petitioner-leaders.
The Core Holdings:
1. On Protest and Police Power: In the absence of a legally promulgated order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., the police cannot arbitrarily prevent a peaceful protest or declare an assembly unlawful. The fundamental right to peaceful assembly under Article 19(1)(a) must be respected.
2. On Vicarious Liability: Political leaders cannot be held criminally liable for the actions of a crowd (under Sections 149, 332, 353) based solely on their presence or leadership, unless specific allegations of incitement to violence or active participation are made.
3. On Prosecution Strategy: While the procedure under Section 195 Cr.P.C. is mandatory only at the cognizance stage, investigators and prosecutors must be cautious. If the core of the incident is defiance of a public order (Sec 188 IPC) and other offences are inextricably linked, attempting to "split" the transaction may be legally untenable.
4. On Quashing Powers: The High Court reaffirmed its duty under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of the legal process. Where an FIR and chargesheet, taken at face value, fail to disclose the essential ingredients of alleged offences, they must be quashed to save citizens from a protracted and unjust trial.
Actionable Takeaways for Professionals and Bureaucrats
For Police Officers & Investigators:
Know the Legal Basis for Action: Before restraining a protest or declaring an assembly unlawful, ensure a valid, promulgated order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. or other relevant law exists. Oral instructions do not suffice.
Specificity in FIRs: When registering an FIR against individuals in a crowd, strive to attribute specific overt acts. General allegations like "instigated the crowd" are weak unless supported by what was said or done. Note specific words, gestures, or actions.
Document Injuries Precisely: MLRs are critical. Distinguish between injuries from targeted violence (e.g., stone pelting, blows) and those from crowd dynamics (pushing, jostling). This impacts the applicability of sections like 332 IPC.
Understand Section 195: Know that while you can investigate, the Magistrate will eventually need a written complaint from the aggrieved public servant for offences under Sections 172-188 IPC.
For Magistrates & Duty Magistrates:
i. Scrutinize Protest-Related FIRs: Apply judicial mind at the cognizance stage. Check for the existence of a valid prohibitory order if the assembly is called unlawful. Scrutinize whether specific allegations connect the accused to the violence.
ii. Enforce Section 195 Cr.P.C.: As the gatekeeper, refuse to take cognizance of offences under Sections 172-188 IPC without the mandated written complaint. Examine whether other charged offences are truly independent of the Section 195 offence or part of a composite transaction.
For Public Prosecutors:
i. Advise Investigators Early: Guide the police on the legal requirements of Section 195 Cr.P.C. and the perils of attempting to "split" a composite transaction. This can prevent cases from being dismissed later.
ii. Review Chargesheets Rigorously: Before filing, ensure the chargesheet clearly links evidence to the specific ingredients of each offence alleged against each accused. A chargesheet that admits the accused were not identified for violent acts is likely defective.
For Political Leaders & Organizers:
i. Peaceful Protest is a Right: You have a constitutionally protected right to assemble and protest peacefully. The state must justify any restriction with a specific, legal order.
ii. Responsibility and Communication: While leading protests, maintain clear communication with participants about peaceful conduct. Publicly dissociate from and condemn any violent acts by rogue elements within a crowd. This can help negate allegations of "common intention."
iii. Legal Recourse is Available: If charged without specific evidence, the remedy under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing is a potent tool, as demonstrated in this case.
For Bureaucrats & Administrators:
i. Promulgate Orders Correctly: Any order restricting assembly (like under Section 144) must be formally promulgated and published for it to have legal force. Ad-hoc restrictions are legally fragile.
ii. Dialogue Over Confrontation: The judgment implicitly endorses the police's initial offer to allow a delegation to submit a memorandum. Exploring dialogue and designated protest spaces can often prevent escalations that lead to legal challenges.
Conclusion: A Judgment for Democratic Balance
The Punjab & Haryana High Court's decision in Bhagwant Mann & Ors. v. U.T. Chandigarh is more than just the quashing of one FIR. It is a judicial reminder of the delicate balance in a democracy. It affirms that the right to dissent is not a crime, that police power must be exercised within strict legal confines, and that criminal liability, especially for leaders, requires concrete allegations, not guilt by association.
By upholding procedural safeguards (like the spirit of Section 195 Cr.P.C.) and demanding factual specificity in allegations, the judgment strengthens the rule of law. It ensures that the legal process is not used as a tool to silence political opposition, while simultaneously clarifying that genuine violence and obstruction of duty will, and should, face consequences—provided they are properly alleged and proven against specific individuals. This clarity is indispensable for a functioning democracy governed by laws, not by force or vague accusations.
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