The bedrock of any criminal justice system premised on fairness is the principle of audi alteram partem – to hear the other side. This cardinal tenet of natural justice finds a crucial procedural embodiment in the Indian criminal process under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Far from being a perfunctory ritual, this provision is the statutory manifestation of the accused’s right to be heard, to explain, and to defend. A recent judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Chandan Pasi & Ors. v. The State of Bihar (Criminal Appeal Nos. 5137-5138 of 2025, decided on 01.12.2025) offers a stark, almost textbook, illustration of how a cavalier approach to this mandatory procedure can fatally undermine a criminal trial, leading to the reversal of a life conviction and a remand for fresh compliance.
This blog post delves into the Chandan Pasi judgment, analyzing the Court’s robust reiteration of the law on Section 313 CrPC, dissecting the fatal flaws found in the trial record, and exploring the profound implications of treating this examination as a mere procedural formality versus a substantive right.
The Factual Matrix and Procedural History
The case arose from a tragic incident on 31st March 2016, where Ghughali Pasi was allegedly assaulted and killed. The prosecution’s case was that the informant, his family, and the appellants were returning from fields when they were surrounded by the accused persons, leading to the fatal assault. After a full-fledged trial, the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Buxar, convicted six persons, including the three appellants—Chandan Pasi, Pappu Pasi, and Gidik Pasi—for offences under Sections 302 (murder), 448 (house-trespass), and 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court of Judicature at Patna affirmed the conviction and sentence in appeal.
Before the Supreme Court, one of the primary grounds of challenge was the alleged non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 313 CrPC. The Apex Court, in its wisdom, chose to examine this threshold issue first, noting that if made out, it would obviate the need to delve into other grounds.
The Jurisprudential Cornerstone: The Law on Section 313 CrPC
Before examining the facts of the case, the Supreme Court, through a bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, meticulously recapitulated the settled law on the scope and object of Section 313 CrPC. The judgment serves as a compendium of principles, drawing from a catena of precedents.
The Court reaffirmed that the object of Section 313 is dual-fold:
1. To put all incriminating evidence to the accused, granting them an opportunity to explain such circumstances.
2. To permit the accused to put forward their own version or reasons for their alleged involvement or non-involvement.
The Court cited its landmark observations in Sanatan Naskar v. State of W.B. (2010), emphasizing that the process is a "direct dialogue between the court and the accused" and is "not a mere formality." This dialogue is meant to benefit the accused and aid the court in its truth-seeking mission.
The judgment then extensively referred to the principles crystallized in Indrakunwar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2023) and the factors laid down in Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023), approved by a three-judge bench in Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh v. State of U.P. (2025). The synthesis of these principles yields the following non-negotiable mandates:
1. Mandatory & Incumbent Duty: The court is under a solemn obligation to examine the accused. This duty is personal to the court and cannot be delegated.
2. Material Circumstances Must Be Put Specifically: Each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused must be put "specifically, distinctively and separately." A material circumstance is one on the basis of which the prosecution seeks conviction.
3. Consequences of Omission: Failure to put material circumstances is a serious irregularity. Circumstances not put to the accused must be eschewed from consideration as no opportunity to explain them was afforded. Such omission vitiates the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused.
4. Not a Substitute for Evidence: The statement under Section 313 is not made on oath and is not a substantive piece of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It cannot form the sole basis of conviction. Its utility lies in testing the veracity of the prosecution's case and lending credence to it if inculpatory admissions emerge.
5. Prejudice is Key: The ultimate test for compliance is whether the accused had a real and meaningful opportunity to explain their conduct. The right extends to offering an alternative version of events.
6. Role of the Prosecutor: While the primary duty lies with the court, the prosecutor, as an officer of the court, has a duty to assist in this process to ensure a fair trial, not merely to secure a conviction.
The Fatal Flaw: A "Carbon Copy" Examination
Armed with these clear legal principles, the Supreme Court scrutinized the statements of the three appellants recorded under Section 313 CrPC. What it found was, in its own words, "a sorry state of affairs – an abject failure."
The recorded statements for all three appellants were virtually identical, "carbon copies of each other." The questions posed were generic and failed utterly to meet the standard of putting "each material circumstance specifically, distinctively and separately."
For each appellant, only four questions were recorded:
1. A formal question on whether they had heard the witness depositions.
2. A omnibus question: "The witnesses have alleged and stated that on March 31, 2016, at 8:05 AM, with common intention along with other accused persons killed the Informant's father Ghughali Pasi by assaulting with katta, daba. What do you have to say about this?"
3. Another generic question regarding allegations of entering the house and assaulting other family members.
4. A final question on whether they wished to say anything in their defence, to which each replied, "I am innocent."
The Supreme Court’s critique was scathing. It noted that out of four questions, only two pertained to events, and they were as "general as can be." The second question merely regurgitated the bare allegation of the crime without specifying:
* Which witness deposed to what specific act attributed to the particular accused?
* What was the specific role alleged – who wielded the *katta* or *daba*?
* What was the exact nature of the common intention as evidenced?
The Court held that clubbing all allegations into one vague question and receiving a blanket denial ("False statement") cannot be said to be the putting of every material circumstance. The accused were never confronted with the specific testimonies that formed the crux of the prosecution's chain of circumstantial or direct evidence against them individually.
This failure denied them the very essence of the right—the opportunity to offer a meaningful explanation or an alternative narrative for each specific piece of evidence. The process was reduced to a hollow ritual, devoid of the intended "dialogue."
Broader Implications: Beyond Procedural Lapse to Systemic Duty
The Chandan Pasi judgment makes two critical observations that extend beyond the immediate facts.
First, it critiques the role of the prosecutor. The Court expressed dismay that the prosecutor, in their "desire to secure a conviction," failed in their duty to assist the court in conducting a proper examination. Citing Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P., the Court reminded that a prosecutor is a "minister of justice." Their duty is not to act as a vindictive adversary seeking punishment at all costs but to ensure that the trial is conducted fairly and in accordance with law. A fair examination under Section 313 aids the cause of justice; a shoddy one plants the seed for appellate reversal.
Second, it provides a nuanced remedy sensitive to the passage of time. The Court acknowledged that a trial is "a function of memory," and remanding a case years after the incident poses challenges. However, the prejudice caused by the procedural illegality was so fundamental that it warranted a remand. Striking a balance, the Court limited the remand only to the three appellants before it, protecting the finality of the verdict for the other convicts (qua the other accused persons). It then invoked the observations of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. regarding expeditious disposal and directed the trial court to complete the fresh Section 313 examination and consequent proceedings within four months. This reflects a pragmatic approach—upholding procedural integrity while being cognizant of the rights of all parties and the exigencies of time.
Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Thing Speaks for Itself
The state of the record in Chandan Pasi speaks volumes. Res ipsa loquitur—the thing speaks for itself. The identical, cursory questions for multiple accused facing a serious charge like murder are indefensible. This judgment serves as a powerful admonitio (warning) to trial courts across the country. The examination under Section 313 must be conducted with the seriousness it deserves. It requires judicial engagement and preparation. The judge must sift through the evidence, identify the precise circumstances implicating each accused, and frame clear, separate questions on each. This cannot be outsourced to a clerk or done through a standardized template.
Conclusion: Reaffirming the Dialogue of Justice
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chandan Pasi is a significant reaffirmation of foundational principles. It underscores that in the adversarial system, the pursuit of truth is not a one-way street. The conviction of an accused, however grave the charge, cannot stand on the edifice of a trial where a core procedural safeguard was rendered pro forma and meaningless.
The judgment elevates Section 313 CrPC from the dusty pages of procedure to the living heart of a fair trial. It is a reminder that justice is not merely about outcomes but about process. A meaningful dialogue with the accused is not a concession; it is a constitutional imperative rooted in the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair defense. When a court asks, "Quid dicis ad haec?" (What do you say to these things?), it must truly put "these things" – the specific, incriminating facts – before the accused. Only then can the answer, whether in denial, explanation, or silence, be said to have been given in a trial worthy of being called just.
The remand ordered is not a technicality triumphing over substance; it is the substance of fair trial procedure reclaiming its rightful place. As the case returns to the trial court for that crucial dialogue to be held de novo, it carries with it a clear message: in the court of law, every voice must be heard, and every accusation must be distinctly put, for that is the sine qua non of a verdict that commands legitimacy and respect.
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