1. The sale of a property through a court-auction is a high-stakes process, designed to balance the rights of a creditor to recover their dues and a debtor to protect their asset from a distress sale. For the third-party purchaser who invests their money in such an auction, it is a leap of faith—a belief that once the gavel falls and the sale is confirmed, they can acquire a clear and undisputed title. But what happens when, years after the sale, the original owner knocks on the judicial doors seeking to set it aside? In a landmark judgment that reinforces the finality of judicial sales, the Supreme Court of India, in *G.R. Selvaraj (Dead) through LRs vs. K.J. Prakash Kumar and others*, delivered a powerful message: judgment debtors cannot sleep on their rights and must raise objections in a timely manner, or forever hold their peace.
2. This case, decided on November 25, 2025, revolves around a protracted legal battle over a house in Chennai. It serves as a critical commentary on the interpretation of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which governs the execution of decrees. At the heart of the dispute was a crucial, yet often overlooked, provision: Order XXI Rule 90(3). The Supreme Court’s ruling clarifies that this provision acts as a statutory bar, preventing judgment debtors from raising belated objections that they could have, but did not, raise before the auction was conducted.
3. The factual backdrop of the case is a saga of delayed justice and procedural wrangling. The story began in 1995 when Rasheeda Yasin filed a suit to recover a loan of ₹3.75 lakhs (with interest) from Komala Ammal and her son, K.J. Prakash Kumar. The suit was decreed ex parte in 1997. To recover the dues, Rasheeda Yasin initiated execution proceedings in 1998, seeking the attachment and sale of the judgment debtors' property—a house and site in Chennai.
4. What followed was a long and arduous execution process. The property was put up for auction multiple times between 2000 and 2002. The initial upset price (the minimum reserve price) was set at ₹16.25 lakhs, but there were no bidders. The decree-holder, Rasheeda Yasin, then filed multiple applications to progressively reduce the upset price. Each time, the court issued notices to the judgment debtors. They participated in the initial stages, filing counters and seeking time, but eventually, they stopped appearing and were set ex parte. Finally, after the upset price was reduced to ₹11 lakhs, the property was auctioned on September 12, 2002. G.R. Selvaraj, the appellant, emerged as the successful bidder, purchasing the property for ₹11.03 lakhs. The sale certificate was issued to him in January 2003, and he duly deposited the entire sale consideration.
5. It was only after the sale was concluded and the certificate issued that the judgment debtors sprang into action. They filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC to set aside the sale. Their primary grounds were that the reduction of the upset price was done without proper notice and that the sale was not held at the spot where the property was situated. They made only a bald allegation that the proceedings violated Order XXI Rule 66 CPC. The executing court dismissed their application, a decision that was upheld by the appellate court.
6. The matter then reached the High Court of Madras. The High Court, in its impugned judgment, set aside the auction sale. It did so on a ground that the judgment debtors themselves had not seriously pressed earlier: that the executing court had failed to consider whether selling only a part of the property would have been sufficient to satisfy the decree, as mandated by Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC. The High Court held that this failure caused "substantial injury" to the judgment debtors. It notably sidestepped the statutory bar of Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, implying that the court's duty under Rule 66(2)(a) was so fundamental that the judgment debtors' failure to raise the issue earlier was inconsequential.
7. The legal crux of the appeal before the Supreme Court was precisely this conflict: Does the mandatory duty of the executing court under Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) override the statutory bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3)? Or does the latter provision impose a strict deadline on judgment debtors, barring them from raising any objection that was available to them before the sale proclamation was drawn up?
8. To understand this, we must delve into the law itself. Order XXI Rule 90 allows a judgment debtor or any interested person to apply to set aside a sale on grounds of "material irregularity or fraud" in publishing or conducting it. However, a 1976 amendment introduced a critical sub-rule (3), which states: "No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up." This is the legal equivalent of "use it or lose it." It demands vigilance from the judgment debtor.
9. The respondents (the judgment debtors) relied heavily on pre-amendment Supreme Court judgments, particularly Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao and Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma. In these cases, the Court had emphatically held that it is the duty of the executing court, under Order XXI Rule 64, to first determine whether the sale of the entire property is necessary or if a part would suffice to satisfy the decree. A sale conducted without applying its mind to this aspect was deemed illegal. These judgments, while sound in their reasoning, were delivered in the context of the unamended Rule 90, which did not contain the statutory bar of sub-rule (3).
10. The Supreme Court, in the present case, distinguished these precedents by focusing on the transformative nature of the 1976 amendment. The Court highlighted a pivotal post-amendment ruling: Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. N.L. Anand & Rajinder Singh. In that case, the Court acknowledged the new bar under Rule 90(3), describing it as a "caveat emptor" for the judgment debtor—a warning to be vigilant and not to stand by passively. The Court in Desh Bandhu Gupta held that if a judgment debtor had notice and "acquiesced by taking no action before the date of the sale, he would be precluded to assail its legality or correctness thereafter."
11. The Supreme Court, in G.R. Selvaraj, built upon this reasoning. It held that the introduction of Rule 90(3) was a deliberate legislative act to introduce finality and discipline into the execution process. The provision places a positive obligation on the judgment debtor to raise all possible objections—including the failure of the court to consider the sale of a part of the property—before the sale proclamation is finalized. If they fail to do so, they are statutorily barred from using that very ground to set aside the sale later.
12. Applying this principle to the facts, the Court found the judgment debtors' case untenable. The record was clear: they had been put on notice at every stage of the protracted execution process. They had participated in hearings concerning the reduction of the upset price. They had multiple opportunities over several years to argue that the property was too large and that only a part needed to be sold. Yet, they remained silent on this specific issue. Their failure to raise this objection at the appropriate time, despite having the opportunity, invoked the bar of Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC.
13. The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for recognizing the existence of Rule 90(3) but failing to apply it correctly. The High Court had erroneously treated the executing court's duty under Rule 66(2)(a) as an independent and overriding obligation, irrespective of the judgment debtor's conduct. The Supreme Court corrected this, holding that while the court's duty is mandatory, the remedy for its breach is subject to the procedural discipline imposed by Rule 90(3). To hold otherwise would render the amendment otiose and encourage strategic delays by judgment debtors.
14. This judgment is a significant victory for the sanctity of judicial auctions. It protects bona fide auction purchasers like the late G.R. Selvaraj from the uncertainty of their title being challenged years after they have invested their funds based on a court-certified sale. For such purchasers, the Supreme Court's ruling provides much-needed assurance. It establishes that once they have complied with the auction process and obtained a sale certificate, their rights cannot be easily undone by grounds that the judgment debtor strategically withheld.
15. For judgment debtors and their counsel, the ruling serves as a stern reminder of the importance of proactive litigation in execution proceedings. It is no longer safe to remain passive, hoping to challenge the sale at a later stage. They must meticulously scrutinize every step of the process—the valuation, the description of the property, and crucially, the necessity of selling the whole property—and raise formal objections at the earliest possible opportunity, i.e., before the sale proclamation is drawn up.
16. In conclusion, the Supreme Court's judgment in G.R. Selvaraj vs. K.J. Prakash Kumar masterfully reconciles two competing interests: the duty of the court to protect the judgment debtor from an unfair sale and the overarching need for finality and certainty in judicial processes. By giving full effect to Order XXI Rule 90(3), the Court has reinforced the principle that law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. This decision not only settles a contentious legal issue but also strengthens the integrity of court-driven auction systems, ensuring that the wheels of execution justice turn with both fairness and finality.
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