1. In the intricate theatre of civil litigation, the relationship between a lawyer and their client is one of trust and active collaboration. But what happens when a client goes incommunicado, leaving their counsel in the lurch? Can such a litigant later cry foul and have a judgment set aside, claiming they were denied a fair hearing? In a significant ruling that reinforces the principles of procedural discipline and personal responsibility, the Supreme Court of India, in Shri Digant vs. M/s. P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors., delivered a powerful verdict: a litigant cannot use their own indifference as a weapon to bludgeon the finality of a court’s judgment.
2. This appeal, decided on November 18, 2025, stemmed from a long-drawn rent control dispute in Maharashtra. The Supreme Court’s judgment serves as a crucial precedent, clarifying the limits of a court's obligation when a lawyer reports "no instructions" from a client and, more importantly, defining the narrow scope of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
3. The factual matrix of the case reveals a pattern of evasion. The appellant, Shri Digant, had filed a suit for possession against the respondents (tenants) under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The tenants were served summons but initially did not appear, leading the trial court to proceed ex parte against them. They later applied for and were granted recall of this order, filed their written statements, and continued participation.
4. The turning point came on November 26, 2014. The advocate representing the tenant-respondents submitted a pursis (a formal intimation to the court) marked as Exhibit-42. In this pursis, the lawyer stated that his clients were not attending his office and that he had no instructions from them. Crucially, he attached a copy of a notice he had sent to his clients via RPAD (Registered Post Acknowledgment Due) dated November 20, 2014, informing them of his intended action if they failed to contact him.
5. Despite this development, the suit proceeded. The plaintiff recorded his evidence, and since the defendants led no evidence to rebut it, the suit was decreed in favour of Shri Digant on March 4, 2015. It is vital to note that nearly three months elapsed between the "no instruction" *pursis* and the final decree, yet the tenants took no steps to engage a new lawyer or inform the court of their intention to contest the case.
6. The tenants then appealed to the District Judge under the Rent Control Act. Their primary argument was that the trial court had failed in its duty. They contended that once their counsel filed the "no instruction" pursis, the court should have issued a fresh notice to them directly, informing them to engage another advocate. They argued that the failure to do so deprived them of a fair opportunity to present their case.
7. The Appellate Court, in a remarkably detailed and reasoned order, dismissed this appeal. It conducted a forensic examination of the issue, which formed the bedrock of the subsequent Supreme Court ruling. The appellate judge pinpointed a fatal flaw in the tenants' case: their evasiveness. Throughout the appeal, they consistently refused to state whether they had actually received the notice sent by their own lawyer. The court held that this notice was not a formal withdrawal of the Vakalatnama (the document empowering the lawyer to act) but merely an intimation of a prospective action. Since the lawyer had not formally withdrawn, and the tenants—despite being businessmen and not unsophisticated litigants—had taken no action for three months, they could not blame the court for their own "casual, lazy and indifferent" attitude.
8. Aggrieved, the tenants approached the High Court of Bombay under its writ jurisdiction (Articles 226/227 of the Constitution). The High Court took a diametrically opposite view. It focused on the procedural rules governing the withdrawal of a Vakalatnama as stipulated in the Bombay Civil Manual and the High Court Appellate Side Rules. These rules require an advocate to give a seven-day advance notice to the client before withdrawing. The High Court noted that the notice in this case was posted on November 25, 2024, and the pursis was filed on November 26, 2024, thereby violating the seven-day mandate. It thus held that the trial court should not have accepted the *pursis* and should have ensured the tenants were given a proper opportunity. Consequently, the High Court set aside the decisions of both the lower courts and remanded the matter for a fresh trial.
9. The landlord, Shri Digant, then appealed to the Supreme Court. The core legal question before the Apex Court was twofold: First, did the trial court commit a jurisdictional error by proceeding with the case after the "no instruction" pursis? Second, was the High Court's intervention under Article 227 justified?
10. The Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating the well-settled law on the scope of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227, as laid down in Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Math & Ors. This power is supervisory in nature, intended to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. It is not an appellate power to correct mere errors of fact or law. It should be used sparingly, only in cases of grave injustice resulting from jurisdictional overstepping, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, or a patent perversity in the exercise of jurisdiction.
11. Applying this principle, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had clearly overstepped its bounds. The Appellate Court had delivered a "well-considered decision" after a "threadbare analysis" of the facts. It had correctly distinguished between a formal withdrawal of Vakalatnama and a mere intimation of "no instructions." The Supreme Court endorsed the Appellate Court's reasoning, emphasizing that the tenants' failure to state whether they received their lawyer's notice was a crucial omission. It indicated a lack of bona fides (good faith).
12. The Supreme Court underscored that the procedural rules for Vakalatnama withdrawal, which the High Court heavily relied upon, were not even triggered in this case. The lawyer had not applied to withdraw; he had only reported a lack of instructions. Therefore, the High Court's entire exercise in examining the seven-day notice requirement was "misconceived." The object of the procedure is to protect litigants, but it cannot be used as a shield by those who are deliberately avoiding the judicial process.
13. The ruling firmly places the responsibility for diligent prosecution or defence of a case on the litigant. The court system is not obligated to endlessly chase a litigant who has chosen to disengage. The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged the problem of litigation delays and strategic defaults, where a party, sensing an adverse outcome, deliberately becomes unreachable to derail the proceedings and seek a fresh start later.
14. By restoring the ex parte decree, the Supreme Court sent a strong message that finality in litigation is a value in itself. A litigant cannot approbate and reprobate—first, by abandoning their own counsel and the court process, and then by claiming a violation of natural justice. The principles of natural justice are not a one-way street; they require the concerned party to be vigilant.
15. This judgment is a significant win for decree-holders, who often find themselves in a frustrating loop of ex parte decrees being set aside on hyper-technical grounds, forcing them to re-litigate matters they had already won. It assures them that if the opposite party willfully defaults, the resulting decree will be secure, provided the court process has been followed.
16. For the legal profession, the judgment offers clarity. It protects advocates from being unfairly blamed for the conduct of their non-cooperative clients. An advocate who has duly informed their client of the consequences of non-communication cannot be held responsible for the client's subsequent inaction.
17. In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in Shri Digant vs. M/s. P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors. is a masterclass in balancing procedural fairness with the need for judicial efficiency and finality. It reaffirms that the constitutional power of superintendence under Article 227 is not a substitute for an appeal. Most importantly, it declares that the doors of justice will not remain perpetually open for the indifferent and the evasive litigant. The law helps those who are vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
Citation: Shri Digant vs. M/s. P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors., 2025 INSC 1352 (Civil Appeal No. 13801/2025)
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