The directive principles differ from fundamental rights in this respect that while Fundamental Rights are justiciable (can be enforced by Courts), Directive Principles are non-justiciable.
According to Article 37, the Directive Principles, though they are fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making law, but they are expressly made non-justiciable. On the other hand, fundamental rights are enforceable by the courts (Article 32) and the courts are bound to declare as void any law that is inconsistent with the fundamental rights. The Directive Principles are not so enforceable by the courts nor can the courts declare as void any law which is otherwise valid on the ground that it contravenes any of the directives. In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"The Directive Principles of the State Policy, which by Article 37 are expressly made unenforceable by Courts cannot override the provisions found in Part III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate writs, orders or directions under Article 32. The Chapter on Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by legislative or executive act or orders, except to the extent provided in the appropriate Article in Part III. The Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform and to run as subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. In our opinion that is the correct approach in which the provision found in Parts III and IV have to be understood. However, so long as there is no infringement of any fundamental right to the extent conferred by the provisions in Part III, there can be no objection the State acting in accordance with the directive principles set out in Part IV, but subject again to the legislative and executive powers and limitations conferred on the State under different provisions."
In that case it was held that in case of any conflict between fundamental rights and directive principles the fundamental rights would prevail. But a year later, when the Court dealt with Zamindari Abolition cases its attitude was considerably modified. In the State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, the Court relied on Article 39 in deciding that a certain Zamindari Abolition Act had been passed for a public purpose within the meaning of Article 31. Finally, in Re Kerala Education Bill, the Supreme Court observed that though the directive principles cannot override the fundamental rights, nevertheless, in determining the scope and ambit of fundamental rights the court may not entirely ignore the directive principles but should adopt "the principles of harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible". likewise, a State law which prohibits slaughter of cows and calves and other cattle capable of work has been upheld because it was meant to give effect to Article 48 of the Constitution. Again, Article 44 has been referred to in upholding validity of the excise rules empowering the Central Government to grant exemption from payment of duty to small co-operative societies of weavers producing cotton fabrics on powerlooms. While Part III contains negative injunctions to the State not to do various things, Part IV contains positive commands to the State to promote what may be called a social and welfare State.
Thus although in the earlier decisions the court paid less regard to the directive principles on the ground that they are not justiciable like the Fundamental Rights, yet in its later decisions the Court has taken the view that there is no conflict between the directive principles and the fundamental rights and they supplement each other in aiming at the same goal bringing about a social revolution and the establishment of a welfare State which is envisaged in the Preamble. In view of this the courts have the responsibility to interpret the provisions of the constitution in such a way so as to ensure the implementation of the directive principles and to harmonize the social objectives underlying the directives with the individual rights. This is the mandate of the Constitution not to the Legislature and the Executive only, but to the Courts as well.
Though these directives are not enforceable by the courts, yet these principles have been declared to be fundamental in the governance of the country(Article 37). It is the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. If any Government ignores them they will certainly have to answer for them before the electorate at the time of election. The directive principles are not intended to be merely normal precepts, was made clean by Dr. Ambedkar when he said :
"If any Government ignores them, they will certainly have to answer them before the electorate.
It is, therefore, not correct to criticise these principles as meaningless and useless. It is wrong to say that there is no sanction behind them. In this age of democracy vigilant public opinion is the real force behind an institution which stands for the benefit of the individual. The Government in a parliamentary system is under a constant fire of criticism. The actions of the Government are subject to scrutiny by the masses and the distinguished leaders of the different parties. If the Government pursues a policy in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, people tolerate it, other wise they oust it in the next elections. Since the Directive Principles have been embodied in the Constitution, the Government are bound to implement them. There may not be the legal force behind them but the highest tribunal - the public opinion - stand behind them. No Government can afford to ignore these directives, if it is not keen to doom its future, for all time to come.
There is no antitheses between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. They are meant to supplement one another. Granville Austin, has described the fundamental rights and the directive principles as the "conscience of our Constitution".
In Kesvananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, the SC has said that "fundamental rights and directive principles aim at the same goal of bringing about a social revolution and establishment of a Welfare State and they can be interpreted an applied together. They are supplementary and complimentary to each other. It can well be said that directive principles prescribed the goal to be attained and the fundamental rights lay down the means by which that goal is to be achieved.
In Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. the SC has reiterated the same principle that 'the fundamental rights and directive principles are supplementary and complementary to each other and the provisions in Part III should be interpreted having regard to the preamble and Directive Principles of the State Policy.
The Directive Principles are also relevant to consider what are reasonable restrictions under Article 19. Article 19 permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights. A restriction which promotes any objective embodied in the Directive Principles is usually considered reasonable by courts of law. Thus in the State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, the Supreme Court gave weight to Article 47 which directs the State to bring about prohibition of consumption of intoxicating drink except for medical purposes - to support its decision that the restriction imposed by the Bombay Prohibition Act was a reasonable restriction on the right to engage in any profession or carry on any trade. In Bijoy Cottom Mills v. State of Ajmer, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, because it was enacted to give effect to directive principles of State Policy in Art. 43 of the Constitution. It was held that the fixation of wages for labourers did not violate freedom of trade under Article 19(5).
Directive Principles given status of Fundamental Rights New Dimension- Directive Principles of State Policy provide guidance for interpretation of fundamental Rights as also the statutory rights. In a number of decisions the Supreme Court has given many directive principles of State policy, the status of fundamental rights. In Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P., the directive principle contained in Art. 45 has been raised to the status of a fundamental right. It has been held that children from the age of 6 to 14 years have fundamental right to free and compulsory education. Similarly, 'equal pay for equal work' has been held to be a fundamental right in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, and therefore, enforceable by the Courts. In M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharastra, it has been held that "legal aid" and speedy trial" are fundamental rights under Art. 21 available to all prisoners and can be enforced.
In Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of India, the SC has enforced the provisions of Art. 39(d) by giving the directive principles the status of fundamental rights. In this case the workers sought for a writ of mandamus directing the Union of India to pay equal pay scale in parity with other employees performing similar works. The court held "equal pay for equal work" has assumed the status of fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court made it clear that under the above circumstances "it is trite that the concept of equality implies and requires equal treatment of those who are situated equally" and issue of appropriate directions in the interest of justice.
0 Comments