In a landmark judgment that reaffirms the primacy of statutory planning law and environmental safeguards over executive convenience, the Supreme Court of India has delivered a decisive blow to ad-hoc administrative approvals and regulatory backsliding. The case of Harbinder Singh Sekhon & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. is not merely about a cement grinding unit in Sangrur. It is a profound statement on the binding force of master plans, the illegality of retrospective validation, and the constitutional limits on relaxing environmental standards that protect human life and health.
The judgment, structured in two
distinct parts, addresses two interconnected but separate challenges. The first
part quashes a Change of Land Use granted to Shree Cement North Private Limited
for a cement grinding unit in a rural agricultural zone, holding that a
subsequent executive approval cannot cure an initial jurisdictional defect. The
second part goes further, striking down a nationwide reclassification by the
Central Pollution Control Board that downgraded standalone grinding units from
the "Red" to the "Orange" category, along with
consequential notifications relaxing siting norms. The Court held that such
regulatory dilution, unsupported by demonstrable scientific justification,
violates the precautionary principle and the fundamental rights to life and
equality under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
This is a judgment that every
environmental lawyer, every planning authority, and every industrial proponent
must read and internalize. It is a reminder that the Constitution does not
permit a trade-off where civilian life and health are exposed to foreseeable
harm on the assumption that economic benefit justifies such exposure.
I. The Genesis: A Cement Unit in an
Agricultural Zone
The dispute originated in
Sangrur, Punjab, where Shree Cement North Private Limited purchased
approximately 47.82 acres of land to establish a cement-related industrial
unit. The land, under the notified Master Plan for Sangrur, fell within a rural
agricultural zone. As per the zoning permissibility then prevailing, a red
category industry was not permissible at the site.
Despite this, on 13th December,
2021, the Punjab Bureau of Investment Promotion issued a Change of Land Use
(CLU) in favour of the company. The very next day, on 14th December, 2021, the
Punjab Pollution Control Board granted consent to establish and a No Objection
Certificate under the Single Window mechanism.
A group of agriculturists
residing in the vicinity and Vasant Valley Public School, located in close
proximity to the proposed site, challenged these approvals before the Punjab
and Haryana High Court. They contended that the CLU was granted in a manner not
contemplated by the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act,
1995, and that a red category polluting industry could not be permitted in a
rural agricultural zone.
During the pendency of the writ
petitions, the High Court passed an interim order on 20th September, 2022,
which continued until the final decision. By a common judgment dated 29th
February, 2024, the High Court dismissed both writ petitions. Crucially, the
High Court noted that as on 13th December, 2021, the CLU did not have statutory
backing in the form contemplated by the PRTPD Act. However, it upheld the CLU
on the reasoning that the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development
Board granted approval in its 43rd meeting dated 5th January, 2022. The High
Court treated this subsequent approval as curing the defect and accepted that
the land use permissibility stood validated thereafter.
Aggrieved, the petitioners
approached the Supreme Court.
II. The Statutory Framework: Master Plans and
Their Binding Force
The Supreme Court began its
analysis by laying down the foundational principles governing master plans
under the PRTPD Act. Section 70 of the Act provides that as soon as may be
after the declaration of a planning area, the Designated Planning Agency shall
prepare and submit to the State Government for its approval a Master Plan. The
Master Plan must indicate broadly the manner in which the land in the area
should be used, allocate areas or zones of land for different purposes, and
include zoning regulations to regulate within each zone the location, height,
number of storeys, and size of buildings and other structures.
The Act mandates a participatory
process. The proposed Master Plan must be published, and the public must be
afforded an opportunity to submit objections and suggestions within the
prescribed period. Such objections and suggestions must be considered before
the plan is placed for approval. Section 70(5) then provides that the
Designated Planning Agency, after approval of the State Government, shall
publish the final Master Plan in the Official Gazette after carrying out any
modifications.
Section 75 makes it explicit that
the Master Plan comes into operation from the date of such publication. The
Court emphasized that the Master Plan is not a mere policy document or an
internal administrative guideline. It is a statutory instrument which governs
how land in the planning area is to be used and regulated. Once published, it
binds both the authorities and the public.
Section 76 contemplates periodic
review of the Master Plan at least once every ten years. However, the Act does
not treat review as a mechanism by which land use norms can be altered
informally or on a case-by-case basis. The provision expressly applies the
publication, objection, consideration, and gazette publication requirements to
a revised Master Plan as well. This legislative design ensures that revision of
the Master Plan remains subject to the same safeguards of notice,
participation, and formal publication.
The enforcement provisions in
Sections 79 to 81 reinforce this statutory discipline. Section 79 prohibits, in
mandatory terms, any person from using or permitting to be used any land or
carrying out any development in a planning area otherwise than in conformity
with the Master Plan. Section 80 provides that no development or change of use
of any land shall be undertaken without obtaining written permission from the
competent authority. Section 81 sets out the structured decision-making process
for grant or refusal of permission, including a time-bound decision, the power
to impose conditions, and an obligation to record reasons where permission is
refused.
The Court held that this
statutory scheme leaves no room for doubt. Once a Master Plan has come into
operation under Section 70(5) read with Section 75, the land use permissibility
within the planning area is governed exclusively by the Plan, until it is
altered or revised in the manner prescribed by the Act.
III. Issue I: The Illegality of the Change of
Land Use
Applying this framework to the
facts, the Court held that the CLU dated 13th December, 2021 could not have
been granted when the site fell in a rural agricultural zone under the
operative Master Plan. The Court cited its consistent jurisprudence, including K.
Ramadas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipli and Bangalore Medical Trust v.
B.S. Muddappa, where it was held that zoning and planned development norms
cannot be diluted by ad hoc departures at the cost of public interest.
The Court emphasized that when a
statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done in
that manner and in no other manner. A departure which effectively changes land
use permissibility must satisfy the statutory procedure for alteration,
amendment, or revision contemplated by the PRTPD Act. It cannot rest on
internal approvals or administrative convenience.
The High Court's own finding
that, as on 13th December, 2021, the CLU did not have statutory backing,
assumed decisive significance. The Court held that if on the date of its
issuance the CLU lacked statutory support to permit the proposed use in the relevant
zone, the defect is not a mere irregularity. It goes to the root of
jurisdiction. A permission must be lawful when it is granted. It cannot be
rendered lawful by a later event unless the statute itself so provides.
The Court rejected the argument
that conditions contained in the CLU could cure this foundational objection.
Conditions may regulate the manner in which a permission that is otherwise
lawful may be implemented; they cannot supply jurisdiction where the proposed
land use is impermissible under the operative Master Plan. To accept conditions
as a substitute for conformity with the Plan would invert the statutory order
by permitting what is prohibited under Section 79 first, and leaving compliance
with the Master Plan to future contingencies.
The argument that the proposed
unit would advance industrial development and employment was also rejected.
Such considerations cannot dilute the binding force of the operative Master
Plan or the statutory prohibitions governing land use. Administrative facilitation,
however efficient, must operate within the four corners of the law, not outside
it.
The Court also rejected the
objection founded on alternate remedy or disputed questions of fact. Where
jurisdictional legality is in issue, the matter cannot be non-suited on the
plea that factual aspects may be disputed.
Issue I was answered in favour of
the appellants. The CLU dated 13th December, 2021 was held to be illegal and
without statutory authority.
IV. Issue II: The Futility of Retrospective
Validation
The second issue concerned the
"approval" recorded in the 43rd meeting of the Punjab Regional and
Town Planning and Development Board dated 5th January, 2022. The item placed
before the Planning Board itself described the proposal as requiring ex post
facto approval, and the minutes record that such approval was granted.
The Court held that the
determinative question was not the label applied by the administration, but
whether the decision recorded on 5th January, 2022 is capable, in law, of
operating as an alteration or amendment of the Master Plan so as to
retrospectively validate and cure the admitted defect in the CLU.
The answer was an emphatic no.
Once a Master Plan has come into operation under Section 70(5) read with
Section 75, any change which has the effect of altering land use permissibility
can be brought about only by following the procedure expressly prescribed by
the statute. The review and revision mechanism under Section 76 does not
operate in isolation. It expressly attracts the procedural discipline embodied
in Sections 70 and 75, including publication, invitation and consideration of
objections and suggestions, and formal bringing into operation of the revised
position through publication in the Official Gazette.
A decision recorded in the
minutes of a meeting, or an internal approval accorded by an executive or
statutory body, does not by itself amount to an alteration or amendment that
has been brought into legal operation as part of the Master Plan framework. Section
76 empowers the initiation of a revisionary process. It does not dispense with
the mandatory steps that alone give legal efficacy to a change in the Master
Plan. To treat minutes of a meeting as the functional equivalent of a statutory
amendment would be to collapse the distinction between a proposal to revise and
a revision that has acquired legal force, and would render the procedural
safeguards built into the PRTPD Act otiose.
This conclusion became
inescapable where the asserted "approval" had the effect of
permitting an otherwise impermissible industrial activity in a rural
agricultural zone, with foreseeable implications for the surrounding population
and environment. The PRTPD Act does not contemplate that such fundamental
changes to the planning framework can be effected without adhering to the
statutory discipline that governs the preparation and approval of the Master
Plan itself.
Equally, the statutory scheme
does not contemplate the curing of a jurisdictional defect by retrospective
administrative approval. A CLU which is unlawful on the date of its grant for
want of statutory authority does not become lawful merely because a later
decision purports to validate it, unless the statute expressly confers such a
power of retrospective validation. The PRTPD Act contains no such provision.
The legality of the CLU must therefore be tested with reference to the law and
the operative planning framework as they stood on the date the CLU was granted.
The Court held that where the
PRTPD Act occupies the field and prescribes the manner in which an operative
planning instrument is to be revised or altered, that manner cannot be
substituted by executive decision-making or by treating minutes of a meeting as
the equivalent of an amendment brought into operation under the Act. The
approach adopted by the High Court, which treated the subsequent approval as
curing the illegality of the CLU, was inconsistent with the statutory
structure.
The argument that substantial
financial investment had been made pursuant to the CLU and that interference
would cause prejudice was also rejected. If a permission is without lawful
authority at its inception, no amount of subsequent investment can clothe it
with legality. The principle that no one can acquire rights by acting on an
unlawful permission is fundamental to the rule of law.
Issue II was answered in favour
of the appellants. The approval dated 5th January, 2022 could not lawfully cure
the defect in the CLU.
V. Issue III: Siting Norms and Environmental
Safeguards
The third issue arose at the
intersection of two distinct but complementary safeguards. The first was the
requirement of prior environmental clearance under the EIA Notification, 2006,
before commencement of construction activity or preparation of land at the
site. The second was the siting and proximity discipline applied at the level
of pollution control permissions, including the siting distances prescribed by
the PPCB notification dated 2nd September, 1998, for cement plants and grinding
units, which mandated minimum buffers from residential clusters and educational
institutions.
The record indicated that the
project proponent had applied for Terms of Reference with the SEIAA, Punjab,
which were granted on 28th September, 2021 and amended on 25th November, 2021.
A public hearing was conducted on 19th April, 2022. However, environmental
clearance had not been granted, with the parties attributing the pendency to
interim orders.
The Court held that these steps
did not dilute the basic position that the requirement of prior environmental
clearance is not a post facto formality. The statutory scheme proceeds on the
basis that assessment, public consultation, and appraisal must happen before
the project moves to construction, not after. The fact that environmental
clearance remained pending at the time of the CLU and subsequent approvals
reinforced the conclusion that the permissions were granted without the full
disciplinary framework of environmental law having run its course.
So far as siting was concerned,
the PPCB notification dated 2nd September, 1998 prescribed minimum distances
for cement plants and grinding units, including 300 metres from an educational
institution and 300 metres from a residential area described as a cluster of 15
pucca houses. The PPCB sought to justify the grant of the No Objection
Certificate dated 14th December, 2021, by stating that it was based on SDM
certification and a site visit dated 17th November, 2021. The project proponent
relied upon material stating that the school was beyond the prescribed distance
when measured from the periphery of the proposed site and that there was no
residential cluster of 15 pucca houses within the prescribed radius. The
appellants disputed this position and relied upon material to contend that the
school and residential habitations were in closer proximity.
The Court found that a further
difficulty arose from the manner in which compliance with distance was sought
to be established. The PPCB acknowledged that the measurement was carried out
from the boundary shown by the project proponent and then asserted that the
distance would increase if measured from the source of pollution. This
approach, the Court held, did not satisfy the minimum regulatory discipline.
Siting norms are not satisfied by an assumption that the distance may be more
when measured differently. They require demonstrable compliance on the basis of
identified emission sources and verified measurements. This was particularly so
when, at the relevant stage, the material placed for consideration did not
demonstrably crystallise the emission sources and their configuration in a
manner that would permit verified assessment of siting compliance on objective
parameters.
The argument that the proposed
unit was a clinker grinding unit assessed at the State level as a Category
"B" project, and that it proposed the use of fly ash and control
systems such as bag filters, did not answer the core concern. Classification
for the purposes of appraisal under the EIA Notification does not displace the
obligation to comply with siting safeguards. Proposed mitigation measures and
conditions in a consent to establish do not substitute the minimum siting
standards, nor do they permit the regulator to postpone demonstrable compliance
to a later stage.
The Court invoked the
precautionary principle, recognized in Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union
of India, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, and Hospitality Assn. of Mudumalai v.
In Defence of Environment & Animals. In environmental matters, where a
school is in close proximity and where there is material indicating nearby
habitations, the decision-maker must proceed on the precautionary approach and
must demonstrate, on objective material, that the applicable safeguards have
been complied with.
The submission that compliance
with siting guidelines could be verified at a later stage while considering
consent to operate was firmly rejected. Preventive safeguards, by their very
design, cannot be treated as matters to be tested only after permissions have
been granted or after the project has advanced. Where the regulatory framework
prescribes minimum buffers from habitations and educational institutions, the
satisfaction recorded by the authority must be founded on objective and
verifiable measurements, not on assumptions about future-stage verification.
Issue III was answered in
favour of the appellants. The Court was not satisfied that the siting norms
and safeguards were complied with in the manner required by law.
VI. The Final Order in the Appeals
In view of the above discussion,
the Supreme Court allowed the appeals. The common judgment and order dated 29th
February, 2024 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court was set aside. The
Change of Land Use dated 13th December, 2021 granted in favour of Shree Cement
North Private Limited was quashed. Consequently, the No Objection Certificate
and Consent to Establish dated 14th December, 2021 issued from the pollution
angle were also set aside.
VII. The Writ Petitions: Challenging
National-Level Regulatory Dilution
During the pendency of the
appeals, the Central Pollution Control Board, in January 2025, issued a revised
list of industrial sector categorisation. Under this revised list, the activity
described as "stand-alone grinding unit without CPP (Captive Power
Plant)" was reclassified from the "Red" category to the
"Orange" category. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change issued Notifications GSR 84E dated 29th January, 2025
and GSR 85E dated 30th January, 2025, namely the Control of Air Pollution
(Grant, Refusal Or Cancellation Of Consent) Guidelines, 2025 and the Control of
Water Pollution (Grant, Refusal or Cancellation of Consent) Guidelines, 2025.
These notifications effectively relaxed the applicable siting and regulatory
safeguards for such units.
The appellants, apprehending that
this regulatory dilution would enable the very kind of industrial siting they
had challenged, instituted writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
seeking quashing of the revised categorisation and the consequential
notifications.
VIII. The CPCB's Rationale and Its Rejection
The CPCB relied upon a revised
classification methodology based on a modified Pollution Index framework, under
which industrial activities are assessed on the basis of their potential to
cause air pollution, water pollution, and waste generation, and are thereafter
assigned a cumulative pollution index. The stated justification for revisiting
the 2016 classification was the experience gained over time, increased use of
cleaner fuels, adoption of cleaner technologies, and the need to differentiate
between integrated industrial operations and standalone units.
A central premise of the CPCB's
reasoning was that a stand-alone cement grinding unit without a captive power
plant has a lower pollution potential than an integrated cement plant involving
clinker manufacturing and kiln operations. On this basis, the CPCB treated such
units as a distinct sub-category within the cement sector and placed them in
the "Orange" category upon application of the revised scoring
methodology. The CPCB asserted that the revised methodology was placed in the
public domain, representations were invited, and the final framework was
adopted after examination by a duly constituted committee.
The Supreme Court was
unimpressed. It held that while such a framework may serve as a regulatory tool
for consent management and inspection frequency, it cannot be treated as
determinative where the consequence of reclassification is dilution of preventive
safeguards, particularly siting norms intended to protect habitations and
sensitive receptors such as educational institutions.
The CPCB's principal
justification rested on a comparative distinction between integrated cement
plants and stand-alone grinding units, on the premise that absence of clinker
manufacturing and captive power generation necessarily results in lower pollution
potential. This approach, the Court held, does not address the core concern.
The relevant question is not whether a stand-alone grinding unit is less
polluting than an integrated plant in relative terms, but whether its pollution
potential is sufficiently low to justify a regulatory downgrade that materially
relaxes safeguards governing proximity to civilian habitations.
The Court noted that cement
grinding units, even without CPP, involve extensive handling and processing of
powdered material, which inherently gives rise to particulate emissions and
fugitive dust. These emissions have direct public health implications, particularly
where units are located near residential areas and schools. The revised
categorisation did not demonstrate, on objective and publicly disclosed
material, that such exposure risks had diminished to an extent that warrants a
dilution of the protective buffer.
The reliance on adoption of
cleaner fuels and technologies was equally unpersuasive. The revised framework
proceeded on generic, sector-level assumptions rather than on demonstrated,
site-specific performance. Preventive environmental regulation does not permit
safeguards to be relaxed on the assumption that mitigation will suffice at a
later stage. Where the risk to life and health is foreseeable, safeguards must
operate at the threshold.
Notably, the CPCB itself
recognized that the precautionary principle governs categorisation and that
deviation from a mechanical application of methodology is warranted where
activities pose a high risk of environmental or ecological harm. This recognition,
the Court held, undermined the argument that a uniform application of the
revised methodology could justify dilution of siting norms in sensitive
contexts. The relaxation of minimum siting distances under the impugned
notifications further aggravated the concern. Permitting activities with known
particulate emission characteristics to locate closer to habitations and
schools, without a case-specific and scientifically robust justification,
amounted to a regulatory retreat from settled protective norms.
IX. The Constitutional Threshold for
Interference
The Court acknowledged that as a
general rule, it exercises circumspection in interfering with technical
classifications and regulatory frameworks formulated by expert bodies. Matters
such as industrial categorisation and pollution indices ordinarily fall within
the domain of specialised authorities, and judicial intervention is not
warranted merely because a different view is possible.
However, this principle of
restraint cannot apply where a regulatory classification has the direct and
foreseeable effect of diluting safeguards that protect fundamental rights. When
a classification decision results in a blatant erosion of preventive protections
governing exposure to environmental hazards, the issue ceases to be a matter of
technical regulation alone and assumes constitutional significance.
The Court reiterated that while
judicial restraint is the norm in matters involving policy choices and expert
regulation, environmental adjudication occupies a distinct constitutional
space. Where executive or regulatory action has the effect of exposing
communities to foreseeable environmental harm or diluting preventive safeguards
that protect life and health, judicial intervention is not an act of activism
but a discharge of constitutional duty. This position has been consistently
affirmed in landmark decisions such as Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum, M.C.
Mehta, Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, and A.P.
Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, where this Court held that when
scientific uncertainty coexists with a credible risk to human health or the
environment, courts must err on the side of protection.
In the present case, the revised
categorisation and the consequential relaxation of siting safeguards materially
affected the level of protection available to civilians, including residents
and school-going children, against exposure to industrial pollution. By
lowering the regulatory threshold applicable to an activity with known
particulate emission characteristics, the revised framework permitted such
units to be located closer to habitations and educational institutions without
the need for a case-specific justification addressing the foreseeable risks.
This, the Court held, could not be sustained.
The right to life under Article
21 encompasses the right to a clean and healthy environment. Preventive
environmental safeguards, including siting norms, are the means by which this
right is protected. Where such safeguards are relaxed without a demonstrable
and reasoned basis showing that the underlying risk has been materially
reduced, the resulting action infringes the substantive content of Article 21.
Further, Article 14 also comes into the picture. A regulatory downgrade that
weakens environmental protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of
safeguarding life and health. In the absence of a proportionate and
scientifically substantiated justification, such dilution is arbitrary.
Arbitrariness that impacts life and health cannot be sustained under
constitutional scrutiny.
The precautionary principle,
recognized as the law of the land under Article 21 in Vellore Citizens' Welfare
Forum, mandates that where there is a plausible risk of harm, regulatory
frameworks must err on the side of protection. In the present case, the revised
categorisation prioritised sectoral differentiation over preventive protection,
without adequately addressing exposure risks in sensitive contexts. The Court
did not interfere with classification merely because it concerned industrial
activity. The intervention was warranted because the impugned actions had the
effect of lowering the constitutional minimum of protection guaranteed to
affected communities. Where regulatory action compromises fundamental rights
under Articles 14 and 21, judicial review becomes a constitutional necessity
rather than an intrusion into policy.
X. The Constitutional Balance: Sustainable
Development as Prioritisation
Before proceeding to the
operative directions, the Court underscored the constitutional balance that
must govern questions of development and environmental protection. Economic
development and industrial growth are legitimate and important objectives of the
State. The Court does not adopt a posture that is anti-development. However,
the Constitution does not permit these objectives to be pursued by dismantling
the very safeguards that protect life, health, and environmental integrity. The
obligation to ensure a clean and healthy environment for citizens is not
subordinate to the goal of economic growth. Both must coexist, and where they
appear to conflict, the task of constitutional adjudication is to ensure that
the balance struck does not undermine the core of fundamental rights.
The Court held that the doctrine
of sustainable development is not a slogan of compromise but a principle of
prioritisation. It requires that when developmental activity poses a credible
risk to human health or environmental safety, regulatory frameworks must err on
the side of protection. The Constitution does not permit a trade-off where
civilian life and health are exposed to foreseeable harm on the assumption that
economic benefit or industrial facilitation justifies such exposure. Articles
14 and 21 do not tolerate a regulatory calculus that treats environmental
safety as negotiable.
If regulatory dilution of the
kind impugned were to be accepted, it would mark a fundamental shift in
environmental governance. Sector-level reclassification, divorced from exposure
assessment and local conditions, would effectively permit activities with known
pollution characteristics to locate closer to people, with the justification
that they are less polluting than some other category. This would invert the
logic of environmental protection. The safeguard is not meant to be relaxed
merely because an activity is less polluting than the most polluting benchmark.
The safeguard must remain calibrated to the risk that the activity itself
poses, assessed in light of its specific characteristics and the context in
which it is proposed.
Equally important is the
recognition that environmental harm, once caused, is often irreversible or
incapable of full remediation. Public health consequences, degradation of air
quality, and long-term ecological damage cannot be undone by subsequent regulatory
correction. It is for this reason that environmental regulation is designed to
be preventive rather than reactive. A regulatory framework that allows risk to
materialise first and seeks to address consequences later is fundamentally
incompatible with constitutional environmental jurisprudence.
XI. The Final Directions in the Writ Petitions
For the reasons recorded, the
Supreme Court held that the revised industrial sector categorisation issued by
the CPCB in January 2025, insofar as it reclassifies the activity described as
a "stand-alone grinding unit without CPP" from the "Red"
category to the "Orange" category, could not be sustained in law. The
said reclassification, read together with the consequential relaxation of
siting and regulatory safeguards brought about by Notifications GSR 84E dated
29th January, 2025 and GSR 85E dated 30th January, 2025, had the effect of
diluting preventive environmental protections in a manner inconsistent with the
constitutional mandate to protect life and health.
Accordingly, the Court allowed
the writ petitions to the following extent:
a. The revised industrial sector
categorisation issued by the CPCB in January 2025 was quashed insofar as it
reclassifies the activity described as a "stand-alone grinding unit
without CPP" from the "Red" category to the "Orange"
category.
b. Notifications GSR 84E dated
29th January, 2025 and GSR 85E dated 30th January, 2025 issued by the
MoEF&CC were quashed insofar as they relax the applicable siting and
regulatory safeguards for such units on the basis of the aforesaid
reclassification.
c. Consequently, any consent,
approval, or permission granted solely on the basis of the aforesaid
reclassification or on the basis of the relaxed safeguards introduced by the
impugned notifications shall not survive and shall stand withdrawn, and the
concerned authorities shall take all consequential steps in accordance with
law.
d. The Court clarified that this
judgment shall not preclude the CPCB or the MoEF&CC from undertaking a
fresh exercise of classification or regulatory review in accordance with law,
provided that any such exercise is supported by a reasoned, transparent, and
scientifically substantiated assessment, and is consistent with the
precautionary principle and the constitutional mandate to protect life, health,
and the environment.
XII. Key Takeaways: The Law After Harbinder
Singh Sekhon
1. Master Plans Are Statutory and Binding: A
Master Plan, once published in the Official Gazette under Section 70(5) of the
PRTPD Act, is not a mere policy document. It is a statutory instrument that
binds both the authorities and the public. Land use permissibility is governed
exclusively by the Plan until it is altered in the manner prescribed by the
statute.
2. Ad Hoc Changes Are Impermissible: Any
change that alters land use permissibility must satisfy the statutory procedure
for alteration, amendment, or revision. It cannot rest on internal approvals,
minutes of meetings, or administrative convenience. The safeguards of
publication, objections, and consideration cannot be bypassed.
3. No Retrospective Validation of Illegal
Permissions: A permission that is unlawful on the date of its grant for
want of statutory authority does not become lawful merely because a later
decision purports to validate it, unless the statute expressly confers such a
power of retrospective validation. The rule of law requires that permissions be
lawful when granted.
4. Siting Norms Are Preventive Safeguards:
Minimum siting distances from habitations and educational institutions are not
mere guidelines. They are preventive safeguards designed to protect life and
health. Compliance must be demonstrable on objective and verified measurements,
not on assumptions or future-stage verification.
5. The Precautionary Principle Governs:
Where there is a plausible risk of harm to human health or the environment,
regulatory frameworks must err on the side of protection. This principle is not
negotiable and is part of the law of the land under Article 21.
6. Regulatory Dilution Is Subject to
Constitutional Scrutiny: A regulatory downgrade that weakens environmental
protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of safeguarding life and
health. In the absence of a proportionate and scientifically substantiated
justification, such dilution is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21.
7. Sectoral Classification Cannot Override
Site-Specific Risk: A generic, sector-level reclassification cannot
override the need for site-specific assessment of risk, particularly where the
activity has known emission characteristics and is proposed in proximity to
habitations and schools.
8. Sustainable Development Is Prioritisation,
Not Compromise: The doctrine of sustainable development requires that when
developmental activity poses a credible risk to human health or environmental
safety, regulatory frameworks must err on the side of protection. The
Constitution does not permit a trade-off where civilian life and health are
exposed to foreseeable harm.
9. Judicial Restraint Has Limits: While
courts ordinarily exercise restraint in interfering with technical
classifications and regulatory policy, such restraint cannot extend to
abdication where regulatory action compromises fundamental rights. Where the
constitutional minimum of protection is lowered, judicial intervention becomes
a constitutional necessity.
10. Environmental Harm Is
Often Irreversible: Environmental regulation is designed to be preventive
because harm, once caused, is often irreversible or incapable of full
remediation. A regulatory framework that allows risk to materialise first and
seeks to address consequences later is incompatible with constitutional
environmental jurisprudence.
XIII. Conclusion: The Constitution as a
Shield, Not a Negotiable Instrument
The Supreme Court's judgment in Harbinder
Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab is a powerful reaffirmation that the rule of
law applies equally to the State and to private enterprises, and that
fundamental rights are not negotiable in the pursuit of development.
The first part of the judgment is
a classic exposition of statutory discipline. It holds that executive
authorities cannot grant permissions contrary to a statutory master plan and
then seek to validate them through post facto approvals. The law does not
permit such shortcuts. The procedure established by law is not a formality to
be circumvented; it is the very means by which legality is conferred.
The second part is even more
significant. It strikes down a nationwide regulatory dilution that would have
allowed polluting industries to locate closer to people, on the basis of a
generic classification that ignored site-specific risks. The Court has drawn a
clear constitutional line: regulatory convenience cannot override the right to
life. Sectoral differentiation cannot justify the dilution of preventive
safeguards. And the precautionary principle is not a slogan; it is a binding
constitutional mandate.
This judgment is a reminder that
environmental governance is not a technocratic exercise to be left entirely to
experts. It is a matter of constitutional significance. When regulatory choices
affect the life and health of citizens, those choices must be justified,
transparent, and scientifically robust. They must also be consistent with the
fundamental rights that the Constitution guarantees to every person.
In striking down the illegal CLU
and the nationwide regulatory dilution, the Supreme Court has done more than
decide a dispute between parties. It has reaffirmed that the Constitution
stands as a shield between the citizen and the risks that unregulated
development can pose. It has held that the State, in its quest for development,
cannot dismantle the very safeguards that make life liveable.
Judgment Name: Harbinder
Singh Sekhon & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (Civil Appeal arising out
of SLP(C) No. 8316 of 2024 with connected matters), Supreme Court of India,
decided on February 13, 2026.
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