A Deep Dive into the Allahabad High Court's Ruling on Section 156(3) CrPC and the Limits of Judicial Review
In the intricate machinery of the
Indian criminal justice system, the initial step of setting the law in motion
is often the most critical and contentious. For individuals who find themselves
at the receiving end of a criminal complaint, the instinct is to challenge the
very initiation of proceedings at the earliest opportunity. However, a recent
and succinct judgment from the Allahabad High Court in the case of Nahni and 5
Others vs. State of U.P. and Another serves as a stark reminder of a
significant procedural bar. It reaffirms a settled legal principle: a proposed
accused has no right to file a criminal revision against a Magistrate’s order
directing the police to register an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
This blog post unpacks this
important ruling, explaining its legal foundations for practitioners and its
practical implications for the public. We will explore the nature of a Section
156(3) order, the concept of "interlocutory orders," and the
alternative legal avenues still available to an aggrieved party.
I. The Case at Hand: A Simple Fact Pattern
with a Proflegal Principle
The factual matrix before the
Allahabad High Court was straightforward:
a. Opposite Party No. 2 (the
complainant) filed an application before the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate (ACJM), Hathras, under Section 156(3) CrPC.
b. This provision allows a
Magistrate, upon receiving a complaint, to order the police to register a First
Information Report (FIR) and investigate the case, instead of taking cognizance
and proceeding with the complaint himself.
c. The ACJM, vide order dated
30.10.2023, allowed this application and directed the police to register an FIR
and investigate.
d. The individuals named as
accused in that application—Nahni and five others—felt aggrieved. They filed Criminal
Revision No. 6131 of 2023 before the Allahabad High Court, seeking to set aside
the Magistrate's order.
The revision was called for
hearing. While counsel for the revisionists (the proposed accused) was absent,
the learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA) was present. The AGA raised a
fundamental objection: the criminal revision itself was not maintainable in
law.
II. The Core Legal Issue: Maintainability of
Revision Against a 156(3) Order
The sole question before Justice
Chawan Prakash was whether a person against whom a Magistrate has merely directed
registration of an FIR—but who has not yet been formally summoned as an accused
by the court—can challenge that direction in a revision petition under Section
397 CrPC.
To answer this, the court did not
embark on a fresh analysis. Instead, it relied on the binding precedent set by
a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the landmark case of Father Thomas
vs. State of U.P. and Another (2010). The Full Bench had conclusively settled
this very issue after an in-depth examination.
III. The Full Bench Precedent in Father Thomas:
The Three Pillars
The Full Bench in Father Thomas
had framed and answered three specific questions, which the court in the present
case applied directly. Understanding these answers is key to grasping the
current ruling:
A. Is a 156(3) Order Open to Revision by a
Proposed Accused?
Answer: No.
The Full Bench held that an order
under Section 156(3) CrPC directing the police to register and investigate is
not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom the Magistrate
has neither taken cognizance nor issued any process (summons/warrant).
Reasoning: At the stage of
a 156(3) order, the Magistrate is not acting as a court taking judicial notice
of an offence against a specific individual. The order is an administrative or
executive direction to the police, who are the primary investigating agency for
cognizable offences. The Magistrate merely enables the investigation to begin.
The accused person does not become a party to the proceedings before the
Magistrate at this nascent stage. Their rights and liabilities are not yet
adjudicated. Therefore, they lack the locus standi (legal standing) to
challenge this preliminary, investigative direction.
B. Is a 156(3) Order an "Interlocutory
Order"?
Answer: Yes.
The Full Bench categorically held
that an order made under Section 156(3) CrPC is an interlocutory order.
Understanding
"Interlocutory Order": An interlocutory order is not a final
decision on the rights of the parties. It is a temporary or procedural order
passed during the pendency of a case, which does not terminate the proceedings.
For example, orders on adjournments, discovery of documents,
or—crucially—orders directing investigation.
Legal Consequence: Section
397(2) CrPC explicitly states that the revisionary power of the High Court or
Sessions Court "shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory
order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." By
classifying the 156(3) order as interlocutory, the Full Bench erected a
statutory bar against filing a revision against it.
C. Was the Earlier View in Ajay Malviya
Correct?
Answer: No.
The Full Bench overruled the
earlier view expressed by a Division Bench in Ajay Malviya v. State of U.P.
(2000). The Division Bench had held that since a 156(3) order was amenable to
revision, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an
FIR registered on its basis would not be maintainable.
The Full Bench corrected this,
holding that a 156(3) order is NOT amenable to revision (as explained in A
& B above). Consequently, the corollary—that a writ petition for quashing
the FIR is not maintainable—was also incorrect. This clarification is vital, as
it preserves the writ jurisdiction of the High Court as a potential remedy.
IV. Application to the Present Case: A Swift
Dismissal
Armed with the clear dictum of
the Full Bench, Justice Chawan Prakash had little to deliberate. The order
under challenge was precisely the kind of order discussed in Father Thomas.
a. The Magistrate had passed an
order under Section 156(3) CrPC.
b. The revisionists were persons
against whom no cognizance had been taken, and no process had been issued.
Therefore, following the Full Bench:
I. The order was not open to revision at their instance.
II. The order was interlocutory, and revision
was barred by Section 397(2) CrPC.
Holding: The court held
that "no criminal revision lies against an order passed by the Magistrate
in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing the police to
register an FIR." Consequently, the revision filed by the proposed accused
was not maintainable and was summarily dismissed.
V. Key Takeaways for Legal Practitioners
I. Strategic First Move:
When faced with a Magistrate’s order directing FIR registration under Section
156(3), a lawyer for the proposed accused must immediately abandon the idea of
filing a criminal revision. It is a procedural non-starter and will be
dismissed at the threshold, wasting time and resources.
II. Understanding the Stage:
Distinguish between:
a. Stage 1: Direction for
Investigation (S. 156(3)): No revision lies. The accused is not yet a party
before the court.
b. Stage 2: Taking
Cognizance & Issuing Process (S. 190/204 CrPC): Once the Magistrate, upon
receiving a police report or a complaint, takes cognizance and issues
summons/warrants, the accused becomes a party. Challenging this order of
cognizance/summons may be possible in revision, depending on the facts and
whether it is considered interlocutory.
III. Alternative Remedy - Writ
Jurisdiction: The Father Thomas ruling explicitly keeps the door open for a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court for
quashing the FIR. This is an extraordinary remedy granted when the FIR, on the
face of it, discloses no cognizable offence, or is manifestly frivolous,
vexatious, or an abuse of the process of law. The standard for quashing an FIR
at the investigation stage (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 guidelines) is
very high.
IV. Alternative Remedy -
Anticipatory Bail: The most practical and immediate step for a proposed
accused facing a serious cognizable offence is to approach the appropriate
court for anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC. This secures protection
from arrest during the investigation.
V. Challenge at the
Charge-Sheet Stage: After investigation, if a charge sheet is filed, the
accused can challenge it before the Magistrate at the stage of framing of
charges under Section 239/240 CrPC. If charges are framed, they can be
challenged in revision before the Sessions Court or High Court.
VI. Implications for the Public and
Complainants
I. For the Person Fearing
False Implication: This judgment may seem like a denial of justice. However,
the law’s rationale is to allow the state’s investigative machinery to function
without premature judicial interference. Your protections are not removed but
postponed. Your immediate focus should be on:
a. Consulting a lawyer to assess
the strength of the allegations.
b. Considering an application for
anticipatory bail if arrest is a possibility.
c. Gathering evidence to
demonstrate your innocence, which can be presented to the investigating officer
or later to the court.
If the FIR is patently absurd or malicious,
exploring the costly and discretionary remedy of a writ petition in the High
Court.
II. For the Complainant:
This ruling reinforces the efficacy of Section 156(3) CrPC as a tool for
citizens. If the police refuse to register an FIR in a cognizable case (where
arrest without warrant is possible, e.g., murder, theft, rape, cheating),
approaching the Magistrate under this section is a powerful recourse. The
order, once passed, is relatively immune to quick knockout challenges by the
other side, allowing the investigation to proceed.
III. The Distinction from a
Complaint Case: It is crucial to understand that Section 156(3) leads to a police
investigation. The alternative is filing a complaint case under Section 200
CrPC, where the Magistrate examines the complainant and witnesses and may then
take cognizance directly. The procedure and challenges available to the accused
differ significantly between these two paths.
Conclusion: The Law’s Preference for
Investigation Over Litigation
The Allahabad High Court’s
dismissal of the revision in Nahni and Others is not a judgment on the merits
of the allegations. It is a strict application of procedural law designed to
maintain the efficiency of the criminal process. The philosophy underpinning
this is clear: the stage of investigation should generally be allowed to run
its course without judicial micromanagement initiated by the potential accused.
The law provides a balance. It
grants the complainant a reasonably secure method to initiate a police probe
while reserving multiple, robust stages for the accused to defend
themselves—during investigation (anticipatory bail), after investigation
(challenging the charge sheet), and during trial. This judgment streamlines the
early phase of criminal litigation by eliminating one avenue of challenge that
the law deems premature and disruptive.
For the legal system, it prevents
the clogging of higher courts with revisions against preliminary investigative
directions. For society, it upholds the principle that the truth-seeking
function of a police investigation should not be easily stifled at the very
outset by those it may ultimately expose.
Case Cited: Nahni and 5
Others vs. State of U.P. and Another, Criminal Revision No. 6131 of 2023, High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Judgment dated December 9, 2025.
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