The Supreme Court's judgment in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors., delivered in November 2025, serves as a crucial refresher on the self-imposed restraints governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For legal practitioners and students, this case is a masterclass in understanding when the doors of a High Court will be shut to a writ petitioner, especially when an alternative, equally efficacious statutory remedy exists before the very same court.
This blog post deconstructs the ruling, exploring its key legal principles and their practical implications.
Case Background: A Timeline of Litigation Missteps
The factual matrix of Rikhab Chand Jain is a tale of missed procedural deadlines and strategic errors:
1. 1992: Allegedly smuggled silver (252.177 kg) was seized from the appellant.
2. 1996: The Commissioner of Customs ordered its confiscation and imposed a penalty.
3.1996-2000: The appellant appealed to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT). The CEGAT, in 2000, upheld the confiscation but reduced the penalty. The appellant did not challenge this order further.
4. The Critical Omission: The Customs Act, 1962, provided for a further appeal to the High Court via a "reference" under Section 130 (now replaced). The limitation period for this was 180 days. The appellant let this period lapse.
5. 2003: Instead of filing a belated reference appeal, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 before the Rajasthan High Court, challenging the original 1996 confiscation order and the 2000 CEGAT order.
6. 2011: The High Court dismissed the writ petition, citing two primary reasons:
Alternative Remedy: The appellant failed to exhaust the statutory remedy of appeal under the Customs Act.
Lack of Merit: The court noted that the order of confiscation had attained finality as it was not seriously challenged before the CEGAT.
7. 2012-2025: The appellant approached the Supreme Court, which, in 2025, upheld the High Court's decision.
The Core Legal Issue: Writ Jurisdiction vs. Alternative Remedy
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition on the ground of the appellant's failure to pursue the alternative statutory remedy of an appeal.
The Court's analysis reaffirmed and clarified several foundational principles of constitutional law.
The Established Principle: Alternative Remedy as a Bar, Not a Ouster
The Court began by reiterating a well-settled doctrine: the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226. The power under Article 226 is plenary and discretionary.
However, through a series of self-imposed restrictions, courts have consistently held that a writ petition should not be entertained if an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available. The Court cited classics like Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa and the recent Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, which drew a distinction between the "maintainability" of a writ petition (which is not affected) and its "entertainability" (which is discretionary).
Exceptions to the Rule:
The Court acknowledged the standard exceptions where a writ petition can be entertained despite an alternative remedy:
1. Breach of a Fundamental Right.
2. Violation of the principles of natural justice.
3. Lack of jurisdiction of the authority passing the order.
4. Challenge to the vires/constitutionality of the statute itself.
Since none of these exceptions were applicable in Rikhab Chand's case, the general rule against entertainability applied.
The Pivotal Distinction: When the Alternative Forum is the High Court Itself
The Supreme Court then introduced a critical nuance that forms the crux of this judgment. The case presented a unique scenario: the statutorily designated alternative forum was the High Court itself (in its appellate/reference jurisdiction), and not a lower tribunal or authority.
The Court emphasized that in such a situation, "refusal to entertain the [writ] petition should be the rule and entertaining it an exception." This is a significant hardening of the principle in this specific context.
The Resurgence of Thansingh Nathmal
To cement this point, the Bench resurrected the seminal Constitution Bench decision in ***Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes (1964). The Court extensively quoted a pivotal passage from Thansingh Nathmal, which holds:
"Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed..."
Key Takeaway: The "machinery of the statute" is designed with a specific procedure and hierarchy. When the statute provides a direct path to the High Court's specialized jurisdiction (e.g., a tax reference, a company law appeal), choosing to bypass that path and instead invoke the court's extraordinary writ jurisdiction undermines the statutory scheme. The Court will not allow its extraordinary jurisdiction to be used as a substitute for the statutory one.
The Consequence of Lapsing Limitation: A.V. Venkateswaran Principle
Another fatal flaw in the appellant's case was his delay. The statutory appeal period of 180 days had long expired when he filed the writ petition in 2003.
The Court invoked another Constitution Bench ruling in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani (1961), which held that if a petitioner has, "through his own fault," disabled himself from availing a statutory remedy (by missing the limitation period), he cannot then use that very disability as a ground to seek the discretionary relief under Article 226.
The Court reasoned that the appellant could have, and should have, filed a belated reference application before the High Court under Section 130A of the Customs Act, seeking condonation of delay under the Limitation Act, 1963. The failure to even attempt this route made the writ petition an impermissible "misadventure."
Pleadings Matter: The Fatal Flaw on Merits
Even if the procedural hurdles were overlooked, the Supreme Court found the writ petition substantively deficient. The appellant's counsel argued that the confiscation order was, in fact, challenged before the CEGAT. The Supreme Court agreed that the appeal memo contained such a ground.
However, the Court made a crucial distinction that serves as a vital practice point for advocates:
Urging a Ground vs. Pleading Non-Consideration: Merely listing a point in the "Grounds" section of a writ petition is insufficient. To successfully argue that a lower tribunal failed to consider a specific point, the petitioner must make a specific, verified pleading on oath. The person verifying the petition (having knowledge of the proceedings) must explicitly state that the point was argued before the tribunal but was not dealt with in its order.
The writ petition in this case lacked such a specific averment. The Court noted that not all grounds in a petition are necessarily pressed during hearings. Without a clear pleading of "non-consideration," the High Court was correct in concluding that the confiscation order had attained finality.
Conclusion and Key Takeaways for Legal Practice
The dismissal of Rikhab Chand Jain's appeal reinforces a strict, principled approach to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. For lawyers and law students, the judgment offers several critical lessons:
1. Hierarchy of Remedies is Paramount: Always exhaust the statutory appellate hierarchy before rushing to file a writ petition. The statutory remedy is the main road; Article 226 is a bypass to be used sparingly.
2. The "High Court as Alternative Forum" Rule is Stringent: When the statute provides an appeal to the High Court, the discretion to entertain a writ petition is extremely narrow. The writ jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the specific procedure and limitation period of the statutory appeal.
3. Laches and Delay are Deadly: Unexplained or unjustified delay in invoking writ jurisdiction is a powerful ground for dismissal, especially when the delay has caused the statutory remedy to lapse. The "reasonable period" for a writ petition is often benchmarked against the statutory limitation period.
4.Precision in Pleadings is Non-Negotiable: If your case rests on a lower forum's failure to consider a argument, you must plead this fact specifically and verify it on oath. Vague grounds are judicial orphans; they find no home in a court of law.
5. Condonation of Delay is the First Resort: If you have missed a statutory deadline, your first port of call should be an application for condonation of delay before the statutory forum. Do not assume a writ court will overlook your lapses.
In essence, Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India is a powerful reminder that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Courts is a safety valve, not a primary tap. For the legal profession, it underscores the age-old adage: procedure is the handmaid of justice, and ignoring it comes at one's own peril.
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