.jfif "Domestic Violence")
1. In a significant ruling that clarifies procedural aspects of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar, on November 7, 2025, provided crucial guidance on how respondents can challenge proceedings they deem vexatious or lacking in specific allegations. The case of Reyaz Ahmad Lone & Ors. vs. Naziya Hassan & Anr., presided over by Justice Sanjay Dhar, underscores that while the DV Act is a vital social welfare legislation, its provisions cannot be misused to rope in entire families without a clear basis. The Court emphasized that the Magistrates have inherent powers to drop proceedings against respondents if no prima facie case is made out, ensuring that the process itself does not become a tool for harassment.
2. The petition was filed by Reyaz Ahmad Lone (Petitioner No. 1), his wife Naziya Hassan (Respondent No. 1), and their daughter (Respondent No. 2). The other petitioners were relatives of Reyaz Ahmad. The respondents had initiated a case under Section 12 of the DV Act before the Judicial Magistrate in Srinagar, alleging that the wife was a victim of continuous domestic violence, harassment, and torture at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The Magistrate, vide an interim order dated July 11, 2025, had directed Petitioner No. 1 (the husband) to pay monetary compensation of ₹8,000 per month to his wife, ₹4,000 per month to his daughter, and an additional ₹3,000 per month as rental allowance.
3. The petitioners challenged the entire proceedings and the interim order before the High Court. Their primary contention was that the DV petition was vexatious and contained no specific allegations against the petitioners in their individual capacities. They argued that the allegations were vague, and the relatives of the husband had been unnecessarily impleaded with the ulterior motive of coercing the husband into a favourable settlement. They also contended that the Magistrate had passed the interim order without recording the necessary satisfaction required under Section 18 of the DV Act and had entertained the petition in a "mechanical manner," rendering the proceedings void from the start.
4. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the entire proceedings could be quashed at the initial stage on the grounds of vagueness and alleged misuse of the legal process. This required the Court to interpret the nature and scope of proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act.
5. In a reasoned and pragmatic order, the High Court delineated a clear path for such challenges. The Court made a fundamental distinction right at the outset. It held that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act "cannot be equated with lodging of a criminal complaint or initiation of prosecution." This distinction is crucial. Criminal prosecutions, once initiated, are bound by stricter procedural codes that limit a court's ability to alter or revoke its own orders. However, the DV Act envisions a more fluid and remedial process.
6. The Court elaborated that a DV proceeding is essentially a call for a response from the respondents. The Magistrate, after considering the petition and the responses from all parties, is empowered to shape the proceedings appropriately. This includes the power to revoke summons issued to relatives or even to drop the proceedings against them entirely if, upon examining their responses, the Magistrate finds that they have been "unnecessarily roped in." The Court affirmed that since these proceedings are not strictly criminal, the legal bar that prevents a Magistrate from altering an order in a criminal case does not apply here.
7. To solidify this legal position, the High Court relied on the Supreme Court's precedent in *Kamatchi vs. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022). The Apex Court in that case had held that the issuance of a notice under Section 12 of the DV Act is merely a step to solicit a response and that the principles laid down in Adalat Prasad’s case (which restrict the recall of summons in criminal complaints) do not apply to DV proceedings. This reaffirmed the Magistrate's continuing jurisdiction to review and refine the scope of the case as it progresses.
8. Based on this legal framework, the High Court declined to quash the proceedings outright. Instead, it adopted a balanced approach that respected the statutory mechanism of the DV Act while protecting the rights of the respondents. The Court directed the petitioners to file an application before the trial Magistrate himself, seeking the dropping of proceedings on the very grounds they had raised in the High Court. It directed the Magistrate to hear both parties and pass appropriate orders "expeditiously, preferably within a period of one month."
9. This directive is significant. It reinforces the principle that the trial court is the primary forum for adjudicating factual disputes. The High Court, in its supervisory jurisdiction, was essentially telling the petitioners to first avail the remedy available before the Magistrate, who was fully competent to address their grievances.
10. However, recognizing the potential for harassment when relatives are impleaded, the Court provided interim relief. It ordered that if the petitioners filed the application before the Magistrate within ten days, the further proceedings against the relatives (Petitioners No. 2 and 3) would be stayed until the Magistrate decided their application. This ensured that the relatives would not be forced to undergo the litigation process while their challenge to their impleadment was pending. Notably, this stay was not extended to the husband (Petitioner No. 1), implying that the interim maintenance order against him would continue to operate during this period.
11. The judgment carries several important implications. For respondents in DV cases, particularly relatives who feel wrongfully implicated, it provides a clear and expedited pathway to seek discharge at the earliest stage without having to approach the higher court first. It empowers them to actively challenge their inclusion in the petition on the grounds of vagueness and lack of specific allegations.
12. For trial Magistrates, the ruling is a reminder of their proactive and ongoing role in managing DV cases. They are not mere passive adjudicators but are expected to sift through the allegations and responses to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly and only against the necessary parties. They must ensure that the broad and benevolent scope of the DV Act is not exploited to settle scores or inflict undue pressure on an entire family.
13. For the overall implementation of the DV Act, this judgment strikes a delicate balance. It protects the object of the Act—to provide effective relief to victims of domestic violence—while incorporating necessary checks and balances to prevent its misuse. It affirms that the legislation is a shield for protecting victims, not a sword for waging vendettas.
14. In conclusion, the High Court's decision in Reyaz Ahmad Lone & Ors. vs. Naziya Hassan & Anr. is a lesson in judicial restraint and procedural clarity. By redirecting the petitioners to the trial forum and outlining the Magistrate's inherent powers, the Court has strengthened the foundational structure of the DV Act. It has ensured that the doors of justice remain open for genuine victims while safeguarding individuals from frivolous and vexatious litigation, thereby upholding the principles of natural justice and fair play.
Citation: Reyaz Ahmad Lone & Ors. vs. Naziya Hassan & Anr., CRM(M) No. 677/2025, High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar, Order Dated: November 7, 2025.
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