In a judgment that serves as a stern wake-up call to governmental authorities across the country, the Supreme Court of India has dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha, not on merits, but on the ground of incorrigible, chronic, and unexplained delay. The Court, while tracing the arc of its own jurisprudence on condonation of delay—from the liberal, justice-oriented approach of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji to the exasperated lament of CWT v. Amateur Riders Club—has drawn a clear red line. There is a point beyond which even courts cannot help a litigant, even if that litigant is the State, shackled by its own bureaucratic indifference.
This is not merely a case about a
school’s grant-in-aid. It is a case about the duty of the State to act with
reasonable diligence, the limits of judicial benevolence, and the public policy
underlying the law of limitation. It is a reminder that limitation laws bind
everyone equally, and that the State cannot claim an eternal, unqualified right
to have its delays condoned as a matter of course.
I. The Factual Matrix: A Decade of Slumber
The dispute originated from an
order of the State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, dated 30th December, 2013.
The Tribunal directed the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary
Education to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and non-teaching
staff of Namatara Girls’ High School.
The State of Odisha, aggrieved by
this order, filed an appeal before the High Court of Orissa on 16th October,
2015. The appeal was:
a. Time-barred even at the time
of filing; and
b. Not accompanied by the
certified copy of the impugned order—a fatal defect rendering the appeal
inherently defective ab initio.
For the next eight years, the
State did absolutely nothing to cure this defect. It neither filed the
certified copy nor pursued the appeal with any semblance of diligence. On 26th
April, 2023, the High Court, having run out of patience, dismissed the appeal
solely on the ground of failure to file the certified copy.
This dismissal finally stirred
the State into action—but only just. It obtained the certified copy on 13th
February, 2024, nearly eleven years after the Tribunal’s order. A week later,
it filed an application seeking recall of the dismissal order, along with an
application for condonation of 291 days’ delay in filing the recall
application.
The High Court, on 21st February,
2025, dismissed the condonation application, observing that the appeal filed in
2015 was inherently defective and that the delay in presenting the appeal was in
excess of 11 years. It found no sufficient cause to condone such extraordinary
delay.
Undeterred, the State approached
the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition, with a further delay of 123
days in filing and 96 days in re-filing after curing defects.
II. The Explanation: “Procedural Delay in
Obtaining Approval”
The application for condonation
of delay before the Supreme Court contained the following explanation,
reproduced verbatim by the Court:
“3. It is submitted that the
Petitioner on receipt of order of the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated
26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A. No.
126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the petitioner considered the matter and
sent it to the law department opined that it is a fit case for filing the
present SLP against the impugned judgements dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025.
4. That the delay in filing the
appeal was on account of procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher
authority. The delay caused is not deliberate and intentional.”
The Supreme Court was
unimpressed. It held, in no uncertain terms, that no cause, much less
sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the
State. The explanation was, in the Court’s view, not an explanation at all—it
was a mere excuse, devoid of any particularization or substantiation.
III. The Jurisprudential Trajectory: From
Katiji’s Liberalism to Amateur Riders’ Exasperation
The Supreme Court undertook a
comprehensive survey of its own precedents on condonation of delay,
particularly in cases where the State is the applicant. This survey reveals a
fascinating—and telling—evolution.
I. Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji
(1987): The High-Water Mark of Liberalism
In this landmark decision, a
coordinate Bench of this Court mandated a justice-oriented approach when a ‘State’
seeks condonation of delay, as distinguished from a private party. The Court
famously observed:
“When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested
right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay...
It must be grasped that judiciary
is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do
so.”
This decision became the bedrock
of every subsequent application for condonation of delay filed by the State. It
was cited, relied upon, and invoked as a charter of liberty for indolent
government departments.
II. G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer
(1988): The Institutional Dimension
Close on the heels of Katiji,
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah (as he then was) speaking for another coordinate
Bench added a crucial dimension. The Court recognized that:
“In litigations to which
Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be
ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public
interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.”
The Court acknowledged that governmental
decisions are proverbially slow, encumbered by procedural red tape, and that a
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. It famously observed that
those who bear the responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the
joints.”
III. CWT v. Amateur Riders Club (1994): The
Turning Point
Within six years of Ramegowda,
the very same judge—now Chief Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah—expressed exasperation
and lament at the utter lack of improvement in the State’s conduct. The Court
was faced with a delay of 264 days, explained by the usual refrain of “file
moving from the Board to the Advocate-on-Record and back.”
The Chief Justice, speaking
for the Bench, held:
“This explanation is incapable of
furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the
earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped
that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court in the present
case observed that reading Ramegowda and Amateur Riders one after the other
leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose
hope. The law was laid down in Ramegowda with much optimism; their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism. The Court’s patience,
having been tested to the extreme limit, finally snapped.
IV. Living Media (2012) and Beyond: The
Shift to Strictness
The Court noted that in the last
decade and a half, a discernible shift towards a stricter approach has become
evident. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) , a delay of
427 days was not condoned. In University of Delhi v. Union of India (2020) , a
three-Judge Bench refused to condone a delay of 916 days. More recently, in Majji
Suryakantham v. Jalapally Vijaya Lakshmi (2025) , the Court reiterated that the
law of limitation is founded on public policy, and that the merits of the case
cannot be considered at the stage of condonation of delay.
V. Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023):
Distinguishing Explanation from Excuse
One of us (Justice Dipankar
Datta), in a coordinate Bench decision, drew a crucial distinction between an ‘explanation’
and an ‘excuse’. While a liberal approach may be adopted where a reasonable
explanation is offered, a mere excuse—devoid of particulars, substantiation, or
bona fides—cannot be elevated to the status of a.‘sufficient cause’. The Court
also emphasized the distinction between:
b. An appellate court reviewing a
discretionary order of a High Court granting condonation (where interference is
limited); and
c. This Court considering an
application for condonation in the first instance (where the decision is
original and plenary).
IV. The Application to the Present Case: A
Textbook Example of Indolence
Applying these principles, the
Supreme Court found the State of Odisha’s conduct to be utterly lethargic,
tardy, and indolent—not only before the High Court but also before the Supreme
Court.
| Event | Date | Delay/Default |
| Tribunal’s order | 30.12.2013 |
— |
| Appeal filed without certified
copy | 16.10.2015 | Time-barred ab initio |
| Dismissal for non-filing of
certified copy | 26.04.2023 | 8 years of inaction |
| Certified copy obtained |
13.02.2024 | 11 years after order |
| Recall application filed |
20.02.2024 | 291 days’ delay |
| High Court dismisses
condonation | 21.02.2025 | Delay > 11 years |
| SLP before Supreme Court | 2025
| 123 + 96 days’ delay |
The Court held that condonation
of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion
of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is
shown to a ‘State’, the Court was of the clear opinion that this is not a fit
case where the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of the State of
Odisha.
V. The Doctrine of ‘Sufficient Cause’: A
Requisite Re-statement
The judgment implicitly, but
powerfully, re-states the contours of ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963:
1. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent:
It is not a formality. The applicant must plead and prove facts constituting
sufficient cause. Conjectures and generalizations will not suffice.
2. Explanation v. Excuse: An explanation is
a reasoned, particularized, and credible account of the circumstances causing
delay. An excuse is a vague, unsubstantiated, and ritualistic incantation of
words. The former may be accepted; the latter must be rejected.
3. Due diligence is expected of the State:
The State cannot plead its own institutional inefficiency as a virtue. If the
State chooses to function through a convoluted bureaucratic machinery, it must
also bear the consequences of the delays inherent in such machinery. It cannot
seek to visit those consequences upon the opposite party.
4. Public interest cuts both ways: While it
is true that public interest suffers when the State loses a meritorious case on
limitation, it is equally true that public interest suffers when the State, by
its indolence, denies the opposite party the finality of a favourable decree
and subjects it to endless litigation. The right of a citizen to reap the
benefits of a judicial order cannot be held hostage to the State’s internal
file-pushing exercises.
5. Latitude has limits: The “little play at
the joints” recognized in Ramegowda is not an unlimited licence to
procrastinate. It is a recognition of reality, not a charter for chronic
negligence. Once the joints are dislocated by habitual delay, no amount of play
can restore them.
VI. The Final Order: Dismissal with Reasons
The Supreme Court, after
recalling its initial order dismissing the SLP as withdrawn, proceeded to pass
a detailed reasoned order dismissing the special leave petition as time-barred.
The applications for condonation of delay in filing and in re-filing were rejected.
The Court did not stop at
dismissing the petition. It directed that the reasons be assigned, and assigned
them in elaborate detail. This was a conscious and deliberate act—a message to
all High Courts and all government departments that the era of automatic
condonation for the State is over.
VII. Key Takeaways: The Law After This
Judgment
1. The State is not above the law of limitation.
The Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal did not concern limitation, but the
principle is universal: no litigant, however powerful, is exempt from
procedural laws.
2. Bureaucratic indifference is not ‘sufficient
cause’. The mere incantation of words like “file moved from department to
department” or “approval was awaited” is no longer sufficient. The State must
explain who caused the delay, at what stage, and why it was unavoidable.
3. The distinction between Katiji and Living
Media is one of conduct, not of law. Katiji has not been overruled; it has
been contextualized. The liberalism of Katiji was conditional upon the State
showing bona fide diligence. Where the State shows habitual indolence, the
strictness of Living Media and Amateur Riders will apply.
4. Merits cannot rescue delay. The Supreme
Court has firmly reiterated that the merits of the case are irrelevant at the
stage of condonation of delay. The Court cannot be persuaded to condone an
unexplained delay because the case appears to be strong on merits.
5. This judgment is a precedent, not an
exception. The dismissal of the State of Odisha’s petition is not an
isolated instance of judicial displeasure. It is a declaration of a shift in
judicial attitude. Government departments across the country must take notice
and reform their practices.
VIII. Conclusion: The Shackles Remain, But the
Court Has Spoken
The Supreme Court’s judgment in State
of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School is a classic
illustration of how judicial benevolence, when repeatedly abused, transforms
into judicial admonition. The State of Odisha was given every opportunity to
explain its delay. It failed. It was given the benefit of every doubt. It
squandered it. It was shown latitude. It mistook it for licence.
The Court has now drawn a clear,
bold line. The shackles of bureaucratic indifference are no longer a shield
against the law of limitation. They are, instead, the very chains that bind the
State to its own failures.
This judgment is not merely about
a school’s grant-in-aid. It is about the conscience of the judiciary and the limits
of its patience. It is about the duty of the State to act as a model litigant—not
in words, but in deeds. It is about the right of every citizen to have a decree
executed without having to wait a decade for the State to wake from its
slumber.
The law of limitation is indeed
founded on public policy. But so is the expectation that the State, which
exists to serve the public, will not itself become the greatest obstacle to
public justice.
Judgment Name: State of
Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (SLP (C)
Diary No. 54941/2025), Supreme Court of India, decided on February 09, 2026.
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