Decoding Testamentary Capacity: A Judicial Analysis of Suspicious Circumstances in Nirmal Bhatla & Ors. v. State & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

Introduction

The adjudication of testamentary disputes often hinges on a delicate balance between upholding the solemn last wishes of a testator and vigilantly guarding against fraud and undue influence. The recent judgment of the Delhi High Court in Nirmal Bhatla & Ors. v. State & Ors., delivered by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha, serves as a comprehensive primer on this very balance. The appeal challenged the grant of probate for a Will dated 23.04.1984, executed by the late Dr. A.N. Khosla, a distinguished former Vice-Chancellor, Member of Parliament, and Governor. This blog provides a detailed analysis of the Court’s reasoning, focusing on the critical legal principles surrounding the proof of Wills, the distinction between burden and onus of proof, and the evaluation of alleged suspicious circumstances.

Factual Matrix and Procedural History

The testator, Dr. A.N. Khosla, passed away on 29.05.1984, survived by one son (the petitioner/propounder) and six daughters (the respondents/objectors). The propounded Will principally bequeathed the residential property at 15 Jangpura-B, New Delhi, and movable assets to the petitioner. Other properties in Dehradun were bequeathed to the daughters in specific shares.

The petitioner filed for probate under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (ISA). Objections were filed by four daughters, contending that the Will was forged, the testator lacked testamentary capacity due to multiple paralytic attacks and impaired mental faculties, and that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction as properties outside Delhi exceeded ₹10,000 in value. The trial court granted probate, leading to the present appeal by three daughters 

Contours of the Legal Debate

The appeal presented several core legal issues:

1.  Maintainability & Jurisdiction: Whether probate could be granted only for the Delhi property when the Will dealt with assets in other states.

2.  Testamentary Capacity: Whether a 92-year-old testator, bedridden after paralytic strokes, possessed a sound disposing mind.

3.  Suspicious Circumstances: Whether the presence of the sole beneficiary, the use of a thumb impression, alleged inconsistencies in witness testimony, and the exclusion of daughters from the principal property constituted circumstances warranting rejection of the Will.

4.  Burden and Onus of Proof: The application of the settled principles governing who must prove what and when in probate proceedings.

Court’s Analysis and Findings

 1. Preliminary Issues: Maintainability and Locus

The Court first addressed the appellants’ locus, noting that one appellant had never filed objections in the trial court. While this was noted, the Court proceeded to examine the merits. On jurisdiction, the Court rejected the objection based on Section 273 ISA, holding that a District Judge has the power to grant a limited probate effective within the state when the petition is confined to properties within its jurisdiction.

2. The Foundational Distinction: Burden of Proof vs. Onus of Proof

Before delving into facts, the Court lucidly clarified a pivotal legal concept. It reaffirmed that the burden of proof for proving due execution of a Will under Section 63 of the ISA and Section 68 of the Evidence Act rests squarely and continually on the propounder. This legal burden never shifts.

Conversely, the onus of proof, which is evidentiary, shifts during trial. Once the propounder establishes the basic facts of execution and attestation, the evidentiary onus shifts to the objector to raise and substantiate allegations of undue influence, fraud, or suspicious circumstances. If such circumstances are established, the onus shifts back to the propounder to remove them. This nuanced distinction framed the entire evaluation.

3. Scrutiny of Testamentary Capacity and Execution 

The Court meticulously examined the testimony of key witnesses:

1.   PW-1 (Petitioner/Son): Deposed that the Will was prepared two years prior but thumb-marked on 23.04.1984 in the presence of witnesses. He stated that despite paralysis affecting his father’s right side, his mental faculties remained alert.

2.   PW-2 (Attesting Witness): A colleague of the petitioner, he confirmed his presence, attested that the testator put his thumb impression, and stated the testator was of sound disposing mind, could speak slowly, and understood his affairs.

3.   PW-3 (Dr. Rajiv Handa, Attending Physician): The doctor testified he was present for the execution during a routine visit. He stated the testator had normal mental faculty, requested help to affix his thumb impression due to right-hand paralysis, and was of sound disposing mind.

The Court contrasted this with the objectors’ evidence (RW-1 to RW-4), which largely contained hearsay and generalized claims of the testator being in a “vegetative state.” Crucially, RW-3, who made these claims, admitted she could not name the treating doctor with certainty and had no medical records to substantiate her assertions. Other objectors admitted they were not residing with or regularly attending to the testator in his final years.

Applying Legal Principles to the Facts

The Court invoked precedent to hold that physical infirmity is not synonymous with mental incapacity. Citing Gordhandas Nathlal Patel and Har Narain v. Budhram, the Court emphasized that the test is whether the testator could comprehend the nature of the act and the extent of his property. The testimonies of PW-2 and PW-3, found credible and uncontroverted, established that the bedridden testator retained the necessary cognitive ability.

4. Dissecting the Alleged “Suspicious Circumstances”

 The Court methodically dismantled each circumstance raised by the objectors:

 a.   Advanced Age & Physical Incapacity: As stated, this was not a bar. The evidence showed awareness and comprehension at the time of execution.

b.   Absence of Medical Records: The Court noted the objectors had ample opportunity to seek these records or examine treating doctors during trial but failed to do so. Their belated application under Order XI CPC was rightly rejected by the trial court as vague and dilatory. The propounder cannot be penalized for this failure of the objectors.

c.   Presence of the Beneficiary: Relying on Har Narain (supra) and Pentakota Satyanarayana, the Court held that the mere presence of the sole beneficiary, especially when he was the primary caregiver residing with the testator, is not inherently suspicious. It does not amount to “taking a prominent part” in execution absent proof of undue influence.

d.   Use of Thumb Impression: The Court accepted the medical explanation (right-side paralysis) for not signing. The fact that the unimpaired left thumb was used was logical, and PW-3’s statement about “lifting the hand” was not viewed as sinister.

e.   Inconsistencies in Witness Testimony: Minor discrepancies regarding how long the execution took or when the Will was physically written were deemed peripheral. They did not affect the core unanimous testimony regarding the testator’s mental state, his act of thumb-marking, and due attestation.

f.   Unnatural Disposition/Exclusion of Daughters: The Court found this argument unsubstantiated. Firstly, the daughters were not wholly disinherited; they received specific properties in Dehradun. Secondly, the propounder had produced a registered Will from 1958 showing a consistent pattern of bequeathing the residual estate to his wife and then to the son. The objectors’ vague claims about an earlier Will or a trust for the Jangpura property were unsupported by any evidence. The Court reiterated that a Will is inherently an instrument to deviate from intestate succession.

 5. Distinguishing Cited Precedents

The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the objectors:

   Venkatachala Iyengar, Rani Purnima Debi, Jaswant Kaur: These cases involved genuine suspicious circumstances like inherent contradictions in the Will or proven cognitive impairment. No such foundational infirmity existed here.

   Yashoda Gupta: Involved a failure to produce medical records where the testator’s illness was central and proven. Here, the objectors themselves failed to procure any medical evidence.

   Raja Ram Singh, Harbans Singh, Brahmapal Singh: These cases had clear evidence of dominance, undue influence, or complete exclusion of natural heirs in questionable settings. The factual matrix in the present case was markedly different.

Conclusion and Final Ruling

The Delhi High Court concluded that the propounder had conclusively discharged his primary burden of proving due execution and attestation. The evidentiary onus had validly shifted to the objectors, who failed to discharge it by leading cogent, material evidence to substantiate any fraud, undue influence, or legitimate suspicious circumstance. The alleged doubts were based on conjecture, not proof.

Consequently, the Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgment granting probate for the property at 15 Jangpura-B, New Delhi.

Key Takeaways for Practitioners

1.  Clarity on Burden vs. Onus: This judgment is a timely reminder of this critical distinction. The propounder’s initial hurdle is to cross the threshold of Section 63 ISA and Section 68 Evidence Act. Once crossed, the objector must bring concrete evidence to the table.

2.  Physical Illness ≠ Mental Incapacity: Medical evidence is crucial. Allegations of incapacity must be backed by contemporaneous medical records or expert testimony. Generalized statements from interested relatives are insufficient.

3.  Contextualizing “Suspicious Circumstances”: Not every irregularity is fatal. Circumstances must be of a nature that genuinely affects the core of testamentary capacity or volition. The presence of a caregiver-beneficiary, without more, is increasingly viewed as natural, not suspicious.

4.  Importance of Evidence over Allegation: The case underscores that objections in probate proceedings must be evidence-driven. Vague pleas about earlier Wills, unnatural disposition, or suppression of documents will fail if not substantiated with tangible proof during trial.

5.  Limited Probate is Permissible: The judgment affirms the jurisdiction of a court to grant probate limited to assets within its territory, resolving a common practical hurdle.

The judgment in Nirmal Bhatla reinforces a principle-centric approach to probate litigation, where the court’s role is to ascertain the true intent of the testator based on a rigorous, evidence-based assessment, while filtering out unsubstantiated suspicions. It is an essential read for practitioners navigating the complex evidentiary landscape of testamentary disputes.

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA (JUDGE)

DECEMBER 05, 2025