In a judgment that reads like a legal thriller, the Supreme Court of India has exposed a staggering fraud upon the legal system. Zeba Khan v. State of U.P. & Ors. is not merely a case about cancellation of bail. It is a chronicle of how an individual, armed with forged law degrees, fabricated marksheets, and sheer audacity, managed to infiltrate the highest echelons of the legal profession—securing enrolment as an advocate, membership of the Supreme Court Bar Association, and even admission to an LL.M. programme—all on the strength of documents that Universities and Colleges unequivocally disowned.
The judgment is significant on
multiple fronts:
a. First, it annuls a bail order
granted by the Allahabad High Court on the ground of perversity,
non-application of mind, and suppression of material facts.
b. Second, it reaffirms the
settled distinction between an appeal against grant of bail (which examines the
legality of the order itself) and an application for cancellation of bail
(which examines post-bail conduct).
c. Third, it issues a
comprehensive framework for mandatory disclosure of criminal antecedents in
bail applications, addressing a systemic vulnerability that has been repeatedly
exploited.
d. Fourth, it declines to
transfer investigation to a specialized agency, holding that such extraordinary
relief is not warranted where the investigation is complete and no mala fides
are established.
This is a judgment that every
lawyer, every law student, and every judge must read. It is a mirror held up to
the legal profession, reflecting both its vulnerabilities and its capacity for
self-correction.
I. The Genesis: An FIR That Uncovered a Racket
The story begins with FIR No. 314
of 2024, registered at Police Station Saray Khwaja, District Jaunpur, Uttar
Pradesh, on 23rd August, 2024. The complainant alleged the existence of a large-scale
organized scam and racket involving the fabrication and circulation of forged
legal qualifications and academic certificates. The racket, it was alleged,
enabled individuals to falsely project themselves as advocates and appear
before this Court as well as various High Courts.
The specific allegations against Respondent
No. 2, Mazahar Khan, were chilling in their detail:
a. He had been residing in
Maharashtra for substantial periods between 2016 and 2019.
b. During this period, he neither
took admission in any recognized law college in Uttar Pradesh nor appeared in
any law examination.
c. Despite this, he fabricated
and procured a forged Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) degree and corresponding
marksheets bearing Enrolment/Roll No. PU-16/6710273, purportedly issued by Sarvodaya
Group of Institutions, claimed to be affiliated with Veer Bahadur Singh
Purvanchal University, Jaunpur.
d. These forged documents were
used to falsely project himself as a duly qualified advocate.
e. He printed and circulated visiting
cards bearing the national emblem "Satyameva Jayate" , falsely
displaying multiple academic qualifications including LL.B., LL.M., and
Ph.D.—all allegedly obtained through fraudulent means.
f. He was not merely a consumer
of forged degrees; he was allegedly a supplier, operating a systematic racket
for supplying fake academic qualifications to others.
The prosecution's case was
fortified by two devastating communications:
1.Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal
University, by letter dated 10.08.2024, categorically informed that Sarvodaya
Group of Institutions was not affiliated with the University and that the
marksheet relied upon by Respondent No. 2 was never issued by the University.
2.Sarvodaya Vidyapeeth
Mahavidyalaya, by letter dated 09.05.2025, clarified that the institution does
not offer any law course whatsoever.
II. The Bail Order: A House Built on Sand
Despite this overwhelming prima
facie material, Respondent No. 2 approached the Allahabad High Court for bail.
His case, as presented before the High Court, rested on two planks:
a. The LL.B. degree was genuine
and issued by Sarvodaya Group of Institutions.
b. The complainant, being his
sister-in-law, had falsely implicated him due to an ongoing property dispute.
The High Court, by its impugned
order dated 30.07.2025, granted bail. The order, as the Supreme Court
subsequently found, was vitiated by:
a. Reliance on disputed
documents: The High Court placed reliance on a copy of the result with
marks downloaded from an online verification portal, ignoring the categorical
disclaimer on the downloaded marksheet itself that it cannot be treated as an
original marksheet.
b. Ignorance of material
evidence: The communications from the University and the College,
unequivocally disowning the degree and the institution's affiliation, were completely
overlooked.
c. Suppression of criminal
antecedents: Respondent No. 2 deliberately concealed the existence of
multiple FIRs registered against him across several States.
d. Misleading assertions:
In his petition for quashing the FIR filed before the High Court, Respondent
No. 2 falsely asserted that he had no criminal antecedents and portrayed
himself as a practising advocate of this Court.
III. The Appeal: Annulment, Not Cancellation
The Supreme Court began its
analysis by drawing a sharp, categorical distinction between two distinct
juridical concepts:
| Parameter | Appeal Against
Grant of Bail | Application for Cancellation of Bail |
| Focus of Scrutiny | Legality,
propriety, and correctness of the bail order as it stood at the time of its
grant. | Post-bail conduct and supervening circumstances. |
| Grounds | Perversity,
illegality, non-consideration of relevant factors, reliance on irrelevant
factors, suppression of material facts. | Misuse of liberty, tampering with
evidence, intimidation of witnesses, absconding, violation of bail conditions.
|
| Nature of Relief | Annulment of
the bail order itself. | Cancellation of bail based on subsequent events. |
Citing a catena of authoritative
precedents—State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra
Singh, Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher, Ajwar v. Waseem, Salil
Mahajan v. Avinash Kumar, and Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi)—the Court
reiterated:
"Where a bail order is
demonstrated to be legally untenable or fundamentally perverse, interference by
the appellate court is not an exception, but a judicial imperative. Such
interference does not trench upon the sanctity of personal liberty; rather, it
subserves the rule of law by ensuring that discretionary relief is granted in
conformity with settled legal standards and that the administration of criminal
justice is not undermined by arbitrary or capricious orders."
The Court held that the present
case fell squarely within this category. The High Court had:
a. Ignored relevant material (the
University and College communications).
b. Relied on irrelevant material
(the downloaded marksheet with a disclaimer).
c. Proceeded on a suppressed and
misleading factual matrix (concealment of multiple FIRs).
The bail order was, therefore, perverse
and legally unsustainable, liable to be set aside without any necessity to
await supervening circumstances.
IV. Criminal Antecedents: The Elephant in the
Courtroom
The Supreme Court expressed deep
concern over the systematic suppression of criminal antecedents by Respondent
No. 2. A comprehensive examination of the record reveals that Respondent No. 2
is not an innocent first-time offender falsely implicated in a solitary
incident. On the contrary, he bears the dubious distinction of being involved
in multiple criminal cases registered across different States, alleging
offences of a strikingly consistent nature—primarily relating to forgery,
cheating, fabrication of documents, criminal intimidation, and sexual
harassment.
The first among these is FIR No.
8 of 2025 dated 14th January, 2025, registered at Thilaknagar Police Station,
Bengaluru City, for offences punishable under Sections 34, 419, 420, and 465 of
the Indian Penal Code. Bail has been granted in the said case, which remains
pending trial.
The second is FIR No. 62 of 2025
dated 26th March, 2025, registered at Begampura Police Station, Chhatrapati
Sambhaji Nagar, for offences under Sections 318(4), 318(2), 336(3), 340(2), and
3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Bail has been granted and the matter
is pending.
The third is FIR No. 232 of 2025
dated 6th June, 2025, registered at Khultabad Police Station, Aurangabad Rural,
invoking Sections 318, 319(2), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,
read with Sections 3 and 5 of the Maharashtra University, Board and other
specified examinations (Prevention of Malpractices) Act, 1982. Bail has been
granted and the proceedings are pending.
The fourth, of course, is the
present FIR No. 314 of 2024 dated 23rd August, 2024, registered at Sarai Khwaja
Police Station, Jaunpur, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code, in which bail was granted by the impugned order and now
stands cancelled.
The fifth is FIR No. 136 of 2023
dated 4th July, 2023, registered at Harsul Police Station, Aurangabad Rural,
for offences under Sections 452, 379, 143, 147, 504, and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code. Bail has been granted and the case is pending.
The sixth is FIR No. 124 of 2025
dated 23rd March, 2025, registered at City Chowk Police Station, Chhatrapati
Sambhaji Nagar, for offences under Sections 115(2), 3(5), 333, 351(3), and 352
of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Bail has been granted and the matter
awaits trial.
The seventh is FIR No. 338 of
2016 dated 12th October, 2016, registered at Khultabad Police Station, for
offences under Sections 354A, 504, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Bail has
been granted and the proceedings are ongoing.
The eighth is FIR No. 331 of 2011
dated 13th September, 2011, registered at Kranti Chowk Police Station,
Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar, for offences under Sections 420, 406, 465, 468,
471, 472, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Bail has been granted and the case
remains pending.
The ninth is FIR No. 48 of 2011
dated 8th April, 2011, registered at Khultabad Police Station, for offences
under Sections 419, 420, 465, 468, 471, 474, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The records indicate that the accused was acquitted in the said case, though an
appeal against the acquittal is stated to be pending.
This extensive catalogue of
criminal cases, spanning over a decade and involving allegations of a
strikingly consistent nature, was deliberately and completely suppressed by
Respondent No. 2 both before the High Court in his bail application and in the
petition seeking quashing of the FIR. Even before this Court, only a partial
and evasive disclosure was made in the counter-affidavit, compelling the
inference that the non-disclosure was a calculated strategy to secure
discretionary relief by misleading the Court.
Citing Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj
Singh, the Court held that while a history-sheeter is not disentitled to bail
as a rule, criminal antecedents constitute a significant factor in the exercise
of judicial discretion. They cannot be totally ignored. Citing Neeru Yadav v.
State of U.P. , the Court held that ignoring criminal antecedents amounts to a deviant
exercise of discretion warranting appellate interference.
V. The Conduct While on Bail: Stalking,
Intimidation, and Continued Fraud
Even after the grant of bail,
Respondent No. 2's conduct remained a matter of grave concern. The appellant
alleged, and the Court took judicial notice, that:
a. He stalked and intimidated the
appellant with the intent of forcing her to withdraw the proceedings.
b. He clandestinely took
photographs of the appellant and circulated them on social media platforms to
malign and defame her.
c. He secured admission into an LL.M.
programme at Sandip University, Nashik, by once again relying upon the same
forged and fabricated LL.B. degree.
This Court, by order dated
22.09.2025, had expressly cautioned Respondent No. 2 that any attempt to
intimidate or coerce the appellant into withdrawing the proceedings would
invite strict action. Despite this, the conduct continued.
While the Court noted that
post-bail misconduct is typically a ground for cancellation of bail (as
distinguished from annulment of the grant), it held that the existence of such
allegations further reinforced the conclusion that the original grant of bail
was unsustainable and improvident.
The Court also took note of the
fact that the State Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, after issuance of
notice by this Court in the present proceedings, removed the enrolment of
Respondent No. 2 and debarred him from practice as an advocate. Further, the Bombay
High Court, Aurangabad Bench, vide order dated 23.09.2025, made scathing
observations against Respondent No. 2, noting his deliberate and repeated
non-compliance with judicial orders, including orders passed by this Court. The
High Court observed that Respondent No. 2 is a person of criminal turpitude
with no respect for the rule of law, and that it was a travesty that such a
person was heading an academic institution.
VI. The Prayer for Transfer of Investigation:
Declined
The appellant also prayed for transfer
of the investigation to a specialized agency, alleging the existence of a
larger racket involving forged degrees and invoking considerations of public
interest.
The Court declined this prayer
for three compelling reasons:
1.Investigation Complete:
The investigation had already culminated in the filing of a chargesheet on
14.05.2025, and cognizance had been taken by the learned Magistrate on
26.05.2025.
2.No Exceptional
Circumstances: No specific or substantiated material was placed on record
to demonstrate that the investigation conducted by the State Police was
vitiated by mala fides, bias, or extraneous influence attributable to
Respondent No. 2. There was also no allegation of involvement of high-ranking
police officials.
3.Existing Supervisory
Mechanism: Issues pertaining to verification of law degrees and enrolment
of advocates are already the subject matter of comprehensive directions issued
by this Court in Ajay Shankar Srivastava v. Bar Council of India and M.
Varadhan v. Union of India. A High-Level Committee has been constituted and is
functioning under the continuous monitoring of this Court. A nationwide
verification process is presently underway.
Citing Disha v. State of Gujarat
and K.V. Rajendran v. Superintendent of Police, the Court reiterated that
transfer of investigation to the CBI or any other special agency can be
directed only in rare and exceptional cases where the Court is satisfied that
the accused is a very powerful and influential person, State authorities are
involved, or the investigation has been biased or tainted. Mere dissatisfaction
with the manner of investigation or bald allegations unsupported by cogent
material cannot justify such extraordinary intervention.
The Court, however, clarified
that the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils shall continue to
implement, in letter and spirit, the directions already issued by this Court
and shall submit such progress reports as may be called for by this Court or by
the High-Level Committee.
VII. The Mandate for Truth: Disclosure
Framework for Bail Applications
The most significant and
far-reaching aspect of the judgment is the comprehensive framework for
mandatory disclosure in bail applications. The Court noted that Respondent No.
2's conduct—deliberately concealing nine FIRs before the High Court and making
only partial disclosure before this Court—was not an isolated lapse but
reflected a growing and disturbing trend of accused persons securing
discretionary relief by suppressing material facts.
I. The Jurisprudential Foundation
The Court traced the evolution of
this principle through a line of powerful precedents:
a. Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar
Verma (1995): Anyone who takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of
judicial proceedings and interferes with the administration of justice. Such
persons must be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong
done, but also to deter others.
b. K.D. Sharma v. SAIL (2008): An
applicant who does not come with candid facts and a clean breast cannot hold a
writ of the court with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of material
facts is not advocacy; it is jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring, or
misrepresentation.
c. Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.
(2010): A new creed of litigants has cropped up who do not have any respect for
truth and shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means. A litigant who
attempts to pollute the stream of justice or touches the pure fountain of
justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief.
d. Moti Lal Songara v. Prem
Prakash (2013): Suppression of truth is equivalent to the expression of
falsehood. The maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi gets attracted.
d. Saumya Chaurasia v.
Enforcement Directorate (2024): Every party approaching the court seeking
justice is expected to make full and correct disclosure of material facts.
e. Kusha Duruka v. State of
Odisha (2024): Details of all previous and pending bail applications must be
disclosed. Suppression constitutes fraud on the court.
f. Pradip Sahu v. State of Assam
(2024): Consistent effort by litigants to misrepresent the court wherever they
can.
II. The Disclosure Framework
In continuation of the principles
laid down in Kusha Duruka and Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, the Court
provided an illustrative disclosure framework to be mandatorily included in
every bail application:
A. CASE DETAILS
a. FIR Number & Date
b. Police Station, District and
State
c. Sections invoked
d. Maximum punishment prescribed
B. CUSTODY & PROCEDURAL
COMPLIANCE
a. Date of Arrest
b. Total period of custody
undergone
C. STATUS OF TRIAL
a. Stage of proceedings
(Investigation / Chargesheet / Cognizance / Framing of charges / Trial)
b. Total number of witnesses
cited in the chargesheet
c. Number of prosecution
witnesses examined
D. CRIMINAL ANTECEDENTS
a. FIR No. & Police Station
b. Sections invoked
c. Status (Pending / Acquitted /
Convicted)
E. PREVIOUS BAIL APPLICATIONS
a. Court
b. Case No.
c. Outcome of case
F. COERCIVE PROCESSES
a. Whether any Non-Bailable
Warrant was issued
b. Whether declared a proclaimed
offender
The Court emphasized that this
framework is recommendationary in nature, intended to act as a facilitative
guide, leaving it open to the concerned courts to adopt, adapt, or refine the
same in accordance with their procedural framework and the exigencies of
individual cases.
III. Circulation to All High Courts
The Court directed that:
a. A copy of this judgment be
circulated to the Registrar Generals of all High Courts.
b. The High Courts may examine
the feasibility of issuing appropriate administrative directions or
incorporating suitable provisions in their respective Rules.
c. A copy of this judgment shall
also be circulated to the District Judiciary for guidance.
This is a systemic reform of
profound significance. It addresses a vulnerability that has been repeatedly
exploited—the ability of accused persons with extensive criminal histories to
present themselves as first-time offenders before successive courts and secure
bail through selective disclosure.
VIII. The Final Order: Bail Cancelled,
Surrender Directed
In culmination, the Supreme
Court:
1.Set aside the impugned judgment
dated 30.07.2025 passed by the Allahabad High Court.
2.Cancelled the bail granted to
Respondent No. 2.
3.Directed Respondent No. 2 to surrender
before the jurisdictional Court within a period of two weeks from the date of
the judgment.
4.Directed that in the event of
failure to surrender, the trial Court shall take appropriate steps in
accordance with law to secure his custody.
5.Directed the trial Court to proceed
with the trial independently and conclude the proceedings expeditiously in
accordance with law.
6.Declined the prayer for
transfer of investigation to a special agency.
7.Issued comprehensive directions
and suggestions regarding mandatory disclosure in bail applications.
8.Allowed the criminal appeal.
9.Disposed of all pending
applications.
IX. Key Takeaways: The Law After Zeba Khan
1.Bail Orders Are Not Immune
from Appellate Scrutiny: An order granting bail, if found to be perverse,
illegal, or based on suppression of material facts, is liable to be annulled by
the appellate court. This is distinct from cancellation of bail based on
supervening circumstances. The focus of scrutiny in an appeal against grant of
bail is the legality and correctness of the order itself at the time it was
made.
2.Criminal Antecedents Cannot
Be Ignored: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to
bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Their complete non-consideration, or their suppression by the
accused, vitiates the bail order and renders it vulnerable to appellate
interference.
3.Suppression of Material
Facts is Fraud on the Court: Every applicant seeking bail is under a solemn
obligation to make a fair, complete, and candid disclosure of all material
facts, including criminal antecedents and previous bail applications.
Suppression attracts the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi, and an order
obtained through such suppression is liable to be set aside.
4.Mandatory Disclosure
Framework: Bail applications must now contain specific details regarding
case particulars, custody period, trial status, criminal antecedents, previous
bail applications, and coercive processes. This framework, while illustrative,
is intended to be uniformly adopted by all High Courts and District Courts
across the country.
5.Forged Degrees Strike at the
Root of the Legal System: The case exposes a serious
vulnerability—individuals with forged law degrees securing enrolment as
advocates and appearing before courts. The ongoing nationwide verification
process under the supervision of this Court is both timely and essential. The removal
of Respondent No. 2 from the rolls of the Bar Council is a necessary but
insufficient step; systemic vigilance is required.
6.Transfer of Investigation is
an Extraordinary Remedy: Transfer of investigation to the CBI or a special
agency can be directed only in rare and exceptional cases where the
investigation is biased, tainted, or lacks credibility. Mere dissatisfaction
with the pace or quality of investigation, or bald allegations unsupported by
cogent material, are insufficient to justify such extraordinary intervention.
7.The Duty of Candour Extends
to the Bar: Advocates, as officers of the court, are expected to verify
facts from the record and assist the court fairly. A very high standard of
professionalism and legal acumen is expected, particularly from designated
senior advocates. The Court strongly deprecated the tendency to present
pleadings without due diligence and verification.
8.Family Disputes Do Not
Dilute Gravity of Offences: The existence of a family or property dispute
between the complainant and the accused does not dilute the gravity of
allegations involving impersonation as a legal professional and the use of
forged credentials before courts. Such offences have serious public and
institutional ramifications extending far beyond any private dispute.
9.Consistency in Judicial
Approach: The Court reiterated its earlier direction in Pradhani Jani that
all bail applications filed by different accused in the same FIR should, as far
as possible, be listed before the same Judge to avoid inconsistent orders and
to enable a coherent assessment of the case.
10. Truth as the Foundation of
Justice: The judgment is a powerful reaffirmation that the administration
of justice rests on the foundation of truth. Any attempt to pollute the stream
of justice at its source—by suppression, misrepresentation, or fabrication—will
be met with the full force of judicial power.
X. Conclusion: Truth as the Foundation of
Justice
The judgment in Zeba Khan v.
State of U.P. is a powerful reaffirmation of two foundational principles that
must govern every court proceeding.
First, that liberty is not a
licence to deceive. An accused person is entitled to the presumption of
innocence and the protection of Article 21, but this entitlement does not
extend to the right to secure relief by suppressing the truth. A bail order
obtained on a suppressed and misleading factual matrix is not an order of a
court; it is an order obtained by fraud, and fraud unravels everything. The
Court's power to annul such an order is not merely a discretionary power; it is
a constitutional imperative to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
Second, that the legal profession
has both the capacity and the duty to cleanse itself. The exposure of
Respondent No. 2's forged degrees, his subsequent removal from the rolls of the
Bar Council, and the nationwide verification process now underway are
testaments to this capacity for self-correction. But the judgment goes further.
It does not merely react to a fraud that has been uncovered; it seeks to prevent
future frauds by mandating systemic disclosure requirements.
The framework for mandatory
disclosure in bail applications is, in many ways, the most enduring legacy of
this judgment. It transforms bail adjudication from a process that is often
opaque and dependent on the diligence of individual judges into a process that
is structured, transparent, and evidence-based. It places the onus of candour
squarely on the applicant, where it belongs. It ensures that the court, at the
very threshold, is equipped with the complete factual matrix necessary to
exercise its discretion judiciously.
The Court's observations on the
conduct of the accused while on bail—stalking, intimidation, and continued
reliance on forged documents—serve as a stark reminder that bail is not an
entitlement to be abused. It is a conditional privilege, granted on the
implicit faith that the accused will not obstruct the course of justice. Where
that faith is betrayed, the privilege must be revoked.
The dismissal of the prayer for
transfer of investigation is equally significant. It reflects the Court's
confidence in the existing supervisory mechanisms—both the judicial oversight
of the trial court and the High-Level Committee monitoring the verification of
law degrees. It also reflects the Court's reluctance to assume that every
flawed investigation justifies the extraordinary remedy of transferring it to a
specialized agency. The remedy for a defective investigation is not necessarily
its transfer; it is its correction through judicial oversight
In an era where litigation is
increasingly characterized by what the Court in Dalip Singh called the
"new creed of litigants" who have no respect for truth, this judgment
is a beacon. It reminds every lawyer, every judge, and every litigant that the administration
of justice rests on the foundation of truth, and that any attempt to pollute
the stream of justice at its source will be met with the full force of judicial
power.
The case of Mazahar Khan is, in a
sense, a cautionary tale. It is the story of a man who built an elaborate
edifice of deception—forged degrees, fabricated marksheets, fraudulent
enrolments—and who nearly succeeded in passing himself off as an advocate of
this Court. But it is also the story of how that edifice was exposed, brick by
brick, through the diligent investigation of the State police, the categorical
communications of academic institutions, the vigilant prosecution by the State,
and ultimately, the unwavering scrutiny of the Supreme Court.
The edifice has crumbled. The
bail is cancelled. The enrolment is revoked. The trial must now proceed.
But the framework remains. The
mandate for truth in bail pleadings is now part of the living law of this land.
And that, perhaps, is the most enduring legacy of this judgment.
Judgment Name: Zeba Khan
v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 2026 arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12669 of 2025), Supreme Court of India, decided on
February 11, 2026.
.jpeg)
.jpeg)
.jpeg)
0 Comments